Democracy Without Secularism

In the context of discussing the subject of secularism, we examine a doctoral dissertation titled “Democracy without Secularism: A Pragmatist Critique of Habermas” by the researcher Daniel Michael Mullen. This dissertation was submitted to Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto as part of the requirements for obtaining a PhD degree.

As the relationship between religion and politics is considered one of the most complex issues in contemporary political philosophy, it forms the core focus around which this thesis revolves. The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argues that democracy relies fundamentally on all citizens recognizing the legitimacy of the law. Accordingly, public political debate must appeal solely to “public reason,” which is inherently considered secular. It follows from this view, according to Habermas, that religious citizens must translate their religious reasons and justifications into a secular language accessible to and understandable by the broader public.

In contrast, this thesis argues that religious arguments are fully justified in public discourse if they refrain from dogmatism (fanaticism or rigid doctrine). Furthermore, the researcher posits that there is nothing inherent in secular reasons that necessarily makes them accessible to the public, or makes them more capable of generating a consensus among members of a pluralistic society. If we treat religious arguments simply as arguments built on controversial premises, it becomes unclear why religious arguments specifically are targeted as posing a special problem for liberal democracies—especially since many secular political arguments share this feature and are controversial as well. Admittedly, religious reasons are unlikely to guarantee consensus, but this should not be counted against them if consensus is not the primary and sole goal of democratic discourse.

This thesis clarifies that Habermas, alongside other liberal theorists like John Rawls, placed an exaggerated emphasis on “consensus” as the ultimate goal of democracy. Moreover, what they refer to is not a practical consensus achieved pragmatically through compromises and mutual concessions, but rather an ideal consensus representing an achievement of secular reason. The researcher considers this problematic for two main reasons: first, there is no normative reason to believe that we ought to achieve such a consensus; and second, such a consensus is unlikely to be achieved in practice in any society. Consequently, there appears to be no genuine normative force behind the claim that religious citizens must necessarily translate their arguments into secular language.

In the introduction of the thesis, titled “Charting the Territory,” the researcher indicates that a general consensus exists that it is beneficial for both religion and politics to remain distinct. The state must remain secular and neutral regarding the competing claims of religions and sects. This arrangement prevents any particular religion from exercising a monopoly on public authority, and grants individuals the freedom to practice any religion or no religion at all. However, stating that the state must remain secular is not a very useful statement in practice, as the word “secular” can mean many different things in different contexts. Asserting that a person’s religious faith will never influence their political actions is a naive statement that ignores the complexity of human nature. Therefore, beneath the thin veneer of this consensus lie many deep and complex issues about which people with a strong commitment to democracy can disagree. This project engages with these issues by entering into a critical dialogue with the work of Jürgen Habermas.

Habermas is known in philosophical circles for defending his “Theory of Communicative Action,” an elaborate articulation and defense of Enlightenment principles. Habermas believes that rationalDemocracy Without Secularism: A Pragmatist Critique Of Habermas

In The Context Of Discussing The Topic Of Secularism, We Address A Doctoral Dissertation Entitled “Democracy Without Secularism: A Pragmatist Critique Of Habermas” By The Researcher Daniel Michael Mullen. This Dissertation Was Submitted To Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam And The Institute For Christian Studies In Toronto As Part Of The Requirements For Obtaining A Doctoral Degree. Since The Relationship Between Religion And Politics Is Considered One Of The Most Complex Issues In Contemporary Political Philosophy, It Formulates The Primary Axis Around Which This Thesis Revolves. The German Philosopher Jürgen Habermas Argues That Democracy Depends Fundamentally On The Recognition By All Citizens Of The Legitimacy Of The Law. Accordingly, Public Political Debate Must Appeal Only To “Public Reason,” Which Is Considered inherently Secular By Its Very Nature. It Follows From This View, According To Habermas, That Religious Citizens Must Translate Their Religious Reasons And Justifications Into A Secular Language Accessible To And Understandable By The Broader Public.

In Contrast, This Thesis Argues That Religious Arguments Are Fully Justified In Public Discourse If They Refrain From Dogmatism (Bigotry Or Dogmatic Rigidity). Furthermore, The Researcher Believes That There Is Nothing Inherent In Secular Reasons That Necessarily Makes Them Accessible To The Public, Or Makes Them More Capable Of Generating Consensus Among Members Of A Pluralistic Society. If We Treat Religious Arguments Simply As Arguments Built On Controversial Premises, It Becomes Unclear Why Religious Arguments Specifically Are Targeted As Representing A Special Problem For Liberal Democracies, Especially Since Many Secular Political Arguments Share This Characteristic And Are Also Controversial. Admittedly, Religious Reasons Are Unlikely To Guarantee Consensus, But This Is Not Counted Against Them If Consensus Is Not The Primary And Sole Goal Of Democratic Discourse.

This Thesis Clarifies That Habermas, And Other Liberal Theorists Such As John Rawls, Have Placed An Exaggerated Emphasis On “Consensus” As The Ultimate Goal Of Democracy. Furthermore, What They Point To Is Not Practical Consensus Achieved Pragmatically Through Compromise And Mutual Concessions, But Rather An Idealized Consensus That Represents An Achievement Of Secular Reason. The Researcher Considers This Matter Problematic For Two Main Reasons: First, There Is No Normative Reason Making Us Believe That We Should Achieve Such A Consensus; Second, Such A Consensus Is Unlikely To Be Achieved In Practice In Any Society. Consequently, There Seems To Be No Real Normative Force To The Claim That Religious Citizens Must Necessarily Translate Their Arguments Into Secular Language.

In The Introduction To The Dissertation, Entitled “Charting The Territory,” The Researcher Notes That There Is A General Consensus That It Is Beneficial For Both Religion And Politics To Remain Separate. The State Must Remain Secular And Neutral Regarding The Competing Claims Of Religions And Sects. This Arrangement Prevents Any Particular Religion From Exercising A Monopoly On Public Power, And Gives Individuals The Freedom To Practice Any Religion Or No Religion At All. However, Saying That The State Must Remain Secular Is Not A Very Useful Statement In Practical Terms, As The Word “Secular” Can Mean Many Different Things In Different Contexts. Saying That A Person’s Religious Faith Will Never Affect Their Political Actions Is A Naive Statement That Ignores The Complexity Of Human Nature. Therefore, Beneath The Thin Crust Of This Consensus Lie Many Deep And Complex Issues About Which People With A Strong Commitment To Democracy Can Disagree. This Project Interacts With These Issues By Engaging In A Critical Dialogue With The Works Of Jürgen Habermas.

Habermas Is Known In Philosophical Circles For His Defense Of His “Theory Of Communicative Action,” Which Is A Sophisticated Expression And Defense Of Enlightenment Principles. Habermas Believes That Rational Argumentation Based On Giving Reasons Is The Only Legitimate Force In Political Decision-Making. But For Rationality To Do Its Job, It Must Be Accessible To The Public; That Is, All Citizens Must Recognize Its Legitimacy Regardless Of Their Private Faith Positions. In Recent Years, Habermas Has Begun To Soften His Position Regarding The Legitimacy Of Religious Language In Public Life, Recognizing That We Live In A “Postsecular Society.” This Development Raises Questions About The Extent To Which His Previous Views Are Continuous Compared To His New Writings. The Researcher Traces This Progress Across The Chapters Of The Dissertation And Draws His Own Conclusions, Placing Habermas In Dialogue With Several Interlocutors Such As Charles Taylor, John Rawls, And Richard Rorty.

The First Chapter Of The Dissertation, Entitled “Modernity And Its Discontents,” Takes A Deep Dive Into The Enlightenment Narrative And The Concept Of Secularization. There Are Several Reasons For Devoting The First Chapter To The Historical Background Of The Dissertation’s Topic; First, This Is Where Habermas Himself Begins, Particularly In His First Published Work, “The Structural Transformation Of The Public Sphere,” Which Is Considered An Important Study Of The Cultural Background In Which Our Modern Concept Of The Word “Public” Was Formed. Second, Historical Narrative Is Very Important For Evaluating Habermas’s Thesis On The Normativity Of Secular Public Language. The Traditional Narrative That Describes The Rise Of Liberal Political Structures During The Enlightenment As A Pure Result Of The Unadulterated Progress Of Unbiased Secular Reason Can Be Challenged. This Traditional Narrative Ignores Or Greatly Minimizes The Role That Christianity Played In Shaping The Principles That Became The Bedrock Of Modern Liberal Democracies. Retelling The Story Of Secularization Does Not Necessarily Weaken The Normativity Of Secular Reason, But It Allows Us To Conclude That The Exclusive Normativity Of Secular Language Was Not Assumed At The Birth Of The Modern Liberal Nation-State.

Third, Habermas’s Conclusions Depend On A Specific Interpretation Of Western Intellectual History Called “The Secularization Thesis.” As An Empirical Thesis, It Predicts That Religion Will Inevitably Decline In The Face Of Challenges Coming From Secular Reason, Such As The Explanatory Power Of Science. However, This Prediction Does Not Seem To Come True In The Actual Reality Of Societies. Religion Has Witnessed A Strong Resurgence In Modern History That Secularization Theory Did Not Expect At All. There Is Growing Suspicion That The Enlightenment Narrative Is Not Merely A Neutral Description Of Reason’s Historical March, But Rather A Value-Laden Account Aimed At Marginalizing Certain Parties. The Empirical Secularization Thesis, Which Has Been Largely Discredited, Is Rapidly Giving Way To A Normative Version Stating That The Language Of Secularism Is Simply The Only Permissible Normative Public Language In Western Democracies.

The Researcher Offers An Alternative Narrative That Provides A Correction To The One-Sided History That Often Forms The Background Of Our Contemporary Political Debates. In Contrast To The “Disenchantment Of The World” Narrative That Habermas Inherited From Max Weber, According To Which Religious Ways Of Thinking Gradually Fade Away To Be Replaced By Scientific Thinking, The Researcher Argues That Factors Within Christianity Itself Facilitated The Process Of Secularization, And That The Secular Worldview Became Possible Thanks To Preconditions Within Christian Thought. Secularism Is Not Simply A Matter Of Eliminating Patterns Of Religious Thinking; Rather, It Is Itself A Positive Philosophical Position That Serves Many Of The Same Functions As The Religion It Claims To Replace. In This Context, The Researcher Relies Heavily On Charles Taylor’s Massive Study “A Secular Age.”

The Researcher Adds That Prominent Historical Figures Like John Locke, Who Is Often Depicted As The Founding Father Of The Modern Secular State, Borrowed Many Of His Arguments, Especially In “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” From Christian Sources. Thus, It Is Quite Plausible To See That The Foundations Of The Modern Liberal State In The Seventeenth Century Were Deeply Christian; They Did Not Come Into Existence As A Sudden Invention Of A Purely Secular Philosophy By Nature. It Is Also Plausible To See The Emergence Of Secularization In The Seventeenth Century As A Practical And Deliberative Response To Address The Reality Of “Religious Pluralism,” Rather Than An Inevitable Process Of Disenchantment Of The World. This Reconstructed Narrative Can Help Us Make An Important Philosophical And Historical Distinction Between “Secularization” As A Historical Trajectory And “Secularism” As A Restrictive Ideology, A Distinction That Is Very Useful In Discussing Our Challenging Contemporary Political Situation.

The First Chapter Also Touches Upon The Historical Circumstances Surrounding The Emergence Of The Public Sphere In England In The Seventeenth And Eighteenth Centuries. The Emergence Of The Public Sphere Was Closely Linked To Print Culture, Lay Bible Reading, Actuarial Calculations, Experimental Science, And Capitalist Enterprises. As Habermas Points Out, The Abolition Of Censorship In England Under The Licensing Act Of 1695 Was A Pivotal Step That Cannot Be Overestimated As A Primary Catalyst For The Rise Of The Public Sphere. Representative Democracy And The Appointment Of The First Parliamentary Cabinet Formed A Model For Political Discourse, As Political Opposition Shifted From Using Violence And Trying To Impose Interests By Force To Engaging In Peaceful And Ongoing Critical Debate Between The Governing Party And The Opposition.

Furthermore, The Author Demonstrates How The Scientific Community In The Enlightenment, Especially The “Royal Society” In England, Contributed To Shaping The Model Of Rational Debate. The Successes Achieved By Experimental Science Served As A Powerful Incentive For Believing That Critical Debate, As Exemplified By The Royal Society, Could Be Extended To Include Political And Religious Debate. The Scientific Community Was Seen As A Model For An Ideal Discourse That Produces Consensus Thanks To That Community’s Strict Adherence To The Dictates Of Reason And Evidence. The Knowledge Produced By The Royal Society Was Not Merely Personal Conviction Or Opinion, But Was “Public Knowledge” As Described By Thomas Sprat, One Of The Clergymen Supporting The Society. These Moderate Theologians Often Resorted To Reason To Provide A Simplified And Watered-Down Concept Of Religion, Stripped Of Much Of The Excess Dogma Of Religious Enthusiasts And Zealots.

In His Writings, Locke Prioritizes Reason, Not Unlike Seventeenth-Century Rationalists Who Used The Deductive Method To Derive Conclusions From Definitions And Axioms. Locke Actively Sought To Change The Way Religious Authority Was Exercised In The Public Sphere, Replacing It With Direct Appeals To Publicly Accessible Reason. Through His Book “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Specifically Book IV, It Becomes Clear That Locke Was One Of The Great Rationalists In The Western Tradition, Viewing It As Necessary To Proportion The Degree Of Certainty In Our Beliefs To The Weight Of Available Evidence—A Principle Unquestionably Intended To Exclude The Religious Enthusiasts Of His Day From Influencing The Public Sphere.

In The Context Of Initial Objections To Religious Discourse In The Public Sphere, The First Chapter Raises A Fundamental Question Regarding The Nature Of Religious Reasons. The Researcher Agrees That Religious Arguments Should Not Be Accorded Extra Respect Merely For Being Religious, And That All Public Claims Must Be Subjected To Critical Scrutiny. However, Setting The Rules Of Debate Such That Religious Claims Can Never Satisfy The Conditions Of Public Rationality Amounts To A Biased Presupposition. The Researcher Asks: Does Secular Thinking Truly Hold A Monopoly On Rational Communication? Ultimately, The Researcher Emphasizes The Importance Of Finding A Pragmatic Compromise That Allows For A Multilateral Model Of Public Debate, Avoiding A Unilateral And Flat Insistence On The Abstraction Named “Public Reason,” Thereby Paving The Way For Upcoming Chapters To Discuss Possible Alternatives That Respect Both Pluralism And Faith.

Having Finished Deconstructing The Unilateral Historical Narrative Of The Enlightenment And The Genesis Of Secularism In The First Chapter, The Researcher Moves In The Second Chapter Of The Dissertation To Confront The Contemporary Theoretical And Philosophical Foundation Provided By Jürgen Habermas. The Researcher Daniel Mullen Realizes That Overthrowing The “Secularization Thesis” Historically Is Not Enough To Topple Habermas’s Philosophical Edifice, Because The Latter Does Not Depend Solely On History, But On A Complex Theory Of Language And Communication. Habermas Does Not Demand The Exclusion Of Religious Reasons From Democracy’s Formal Space Merely Out Of Hostility To Religion, But Because His Comprehensive Philosophical Theory Of How Human Society Functions And Generates Political Legitimacy Requires It. Therefore, The Researcher Devotes This Chapter To Analyzing What Is Known As The “Theory Of Communicative Action” And How The Concept Of The “Public Sphere” Emerges From It.

The Researcher Elaborates On Explaining The “Theory Of Communicative Action,” Which Is Considered The Cornerstone Of Habermas’s Entire Philosophy. Habermas Sees That Rationality Does Not Reside In The Consciousness Of An Isolated Individual Contemplating The World (As Descartes Or Kant Assumed), But Is An “Intersubjective” Rationality Realized Through Linguistic Communication. When Individuals Speak With The Aim Of Reaching A Mutual Understanding About Something, They Practice A “Communicative Action.” In Every Communicative Action, The Speaker—Consciously Or Unconsciously—Raises Three Primary Claims Called “Validity Claims,” Which Are:

• Truth: That The Spoken Utterance Corresponds To The External Objective World.

• Rightness: That The Utterance Conforms To The Social World Of Legitimate Norms And Moral Standards.

• Truthfulness Or Sincerity: That The Speaker Sincerely Expresses Their Inner World And True Intentions.

For Communication To Be Rational And Successful, The Listener Must Be Able To Accept Or Reject These Claims Based On “Reasons” And “Arguments” Alone, Not Based On Coercion, Authority, Or Manipulation. Legitimate Democracy, In Habermas’s View, Is An Institutional Extension Of This Communicative Action; Laws Do Not Derive Their Legitimacy From The Power Of The State, But From Being The Product Of Free And Rational Public Debate In Which Everyone Submits To The “Unforced Force Of The Better Argument.”

To Apply This Theory To Politics, The Researcher Clarifies How Habermas Divides The Democratic Space Into Two Primary Tracks Or Levels: The “Informal Public Sphere” (Or Weak) And The “Formal Public Sphere” (Or Strong). The Informal Public Sphere Includes The Press, Internet, Civil Associations, Churches, Public Squares, And Spontaneous Debates In Coffee Houses. This Sphere Is Characterized By Total Fluidity And Creative Chaos, Serving As Sensors Or “Radar” That Picks Up Society’s Problems, Where Language Is Completely Free. In Contrast, There Is The “Formal Public Sphere,” Which Includes Institutions Holding The Authority To Issue Binding Decisions Backed By State Coercion And Police Power, Such As Parliament, Legislative Committees, And Constitutional Courts. Habermas Believes That Moving From Random Debate In The Informal Sphere To Binding Legislation In The Formal Sphere Requires Strict “Filtering” Of Reasons And Arguments, So That Nothing Passes Into Law Except What Can Be Rationally Justified To All Citizens.

Here We Reach The Pivotal Point In The Second Chapter: Why Does Religion Pose A Special Problem In This Habermasian Formulation? The Researcher Clarifies That Habermas Sees Religious Reasons As Lacking A Crucial Feature, Namely “Public Accessibility.” Secular Reasons—Whether Economic, Scientific, Or Rights-Based—Rely On A Common Language And Epistemological Premises That Any Citizen Can Theoretically Understand, Argue Against, And Examine Evidence For Using Their Ordinary Human Reason. Religious Reasons, However, Rest On A “Private Epistemic” Basis: Divine Revelation, Sacred Texts Presupposing Prior Faith, Or Theological Authority Not Recognized By The Rest Of Society’s Spectrum. If A Coercive Law (Such As Banning Abortion Or Prohibiting Work On Religious Holidays) Is Legislated Based On Purely Religious Justifications Offered By Lawmakers, A Citizen Who Does Not Belong To This Religion Will Find Themselves Forced To Obey A Law Whose Reasons They Cannot Understand Or Rationally Accept. This Creates Democratic Alienation And Destroys The Principle Of Deliberative Legitimacy, Which Requires Citizens To View Themselves Not Only As Subjects Of The Law, But As Its “Authors.”

To Avoid Completely Excluding Religious Citizens And Gagging Them, Habermas Introduced A Conceptual Mechanism He Named “The Translation Proviso.” The Researcher Analyzes This Condition With Extreme Precision. The Translation Proviso States That Religious Citizens Are Allowed To Use Their Explicit Religious Language And Arguments Completely Freely Within The “Informal Public Sphere.” However, As Soon As Debate Approaches The Doors Of The “Formal Public Sphere” (Parliament And Courts), These Religious Arguments Must Be “Translated” Into A Neutral Secular Political Language Accepted By All. The Primary Burden Of This Translation Falls On The Shoulders Of The Religious Citizen, Who Must Present The Content Of Their Religious Message In A Secular Rights-Based Mold. Habermas Gives A Famous Example: The Christian Concept Stating That “Human Beings Are Created In The Image Of God” Can Be Translated Into The Secular Constitutional Concept Of “Equal And Inalienable Human Dignity.” In This Way, Religion’s Moral Content Is Saved While Being Emptying Of Its Exclusionary Theological Character, Making It Fit For Formal Legislative Use.

At The End Of The Second Chapter And The Beginnings Of The Third Chapter, The Researcher Daniel Mullen Begins Directing The Artillery Of Pragmatist Critique At This Condition, Offering A Series Of Deep Objections That Go Beyond The Political Surface To Epistemic And Psychological Depths. The First Objection Focuses On What The Researcher Calls The “Asymmetrical Cognitive Burden.” The Researcher Argues That Habermas’s Proviso Creates An Unfair Split Among Citizens. A Secular Citizen (Whether Adopting A Kantian, Economic Liberal, Or Marxist Philosophy) Can Enter The Public Sphere, Use Their Native Language, And Argue Their Basic Concepts Directly Without Being Asked To Justify Them In Another Language. As For The Religious Citizen, They Are Required To Perform An Arduous And Continuous Mental Operation: They Must Divide Their Identity Into Two Halves. A Private Inner Half That Believes In Religion And Derives Its Worldview From It, And A Public Political Half That Must Speak A Language Foreign To It (Secularism) And Justify Its Positions Through It. This Institutionally Imposed Schizophrenia Contradicts The Idea Of Equal Democratic Citizenship, Because It Demands Of Religious People What It Does Not Demand Of Secular People: To Disown Their Mother Tongue Upon Entering The Legislative Arena.

The Researcher Delves Deeper Into Criticizing The Process Of “Translation” Itself Using The Philosophy Of Language. He Argues That Translation Between Languages With Divergent Epistemic Paradigms Can Never Occur Smoothly Without An Essential “Loss Of Meaning.” When We Translate “Creation Of Man In The Image Of God” To Mere “Human Dignity,” We Strip The Religious Concept Of Its Deep Cosmic Context, Its Element Of Awe, And The Sense Of Moral Responsibility Before A Supreme Creator. A Religious Argument Derives Its Binding Force For The Believer From Issuing From A Transcendent Authority, And Stripping It Of This Character Makes It A Dull And Spiritually Dead Argument. More Dangerously, As The Researcher Cleverly Notes, This Translation Proviso Forces Religious Citizens To Violate One Of The Three Pillars Of Habermas’s Own Theory: “Truthfulness.” If A Religious Citizen Is Convinced That Their Opposition To A Law Stems Basically From Believing That This Law Violates God’s Will, But Is Forced In Parliament To Fabricate Utilitarian Secular Arguments They Do Not Internally Believe Just To Satisfy The “Translation Proviso,” They Are At That Moment Practicing Political Hypocrisy And Losing Their Communicative “Sincerity.” Habermas, Through His Attempt To Save Secular Rationality, Drives Religious People Toward Practicing Linguistic Deception In The Public Sphere.

The Researcher Continues Building His Thesis In Preparation For Comprehensive Pragmatist Critique, Attacking The Implicit Habermasian Assumption That “Secular Language Is Neutral Language.” The Researcher Argues Strongly That Secularism Is Not Merely A Communicative Tool Devoid Of Content, Nor Is It The Epistemic Ground Zero Upon Which Everyone Stands. Secularism, In Its Essence, Is A “Comprehensive Doctrine” Possessing Its Own Ontological Assumptions About The Universe, Human Nature, And Sources Of Knowledge. When Habermas Requires That All Arguments Be Translated Into The Secular Framework, He Is Effectively Imposing An “Epistemic Hegemony” Of A Single Paradigm At The Expense Of Others. Democratic Space Engineered In This Manner Is Not A Neutral Space Where Ideas Compete Freely, But A Space Pre-Rigged To Guarantee The Victory Of The Secular Worldview And Subject Religious Visions To Forced Domestication. This Conclusion Opens The Door Wide To The Third Chapter, In Which The Researcher Offers The “Pragmatist” Solution Of Abandoning The Obsession With Comprehensive Rational Consensus And Accepting Practical Compromises.

Having Stopped At Habermas’s “Translation Proviso” And Proven That It Imposes An Asymmetrical Burden On Religious Citizens, The Researcher Raises His Fundamental Question In This Advanced Part Of Chapter Three: If Secular Rationality Is Not Neutral, And If The Translation Proviso Is Unfair, What Is The Philosophical Alternative That Can Keep Democracy Alive In A Pluralistic Society Without Resorting To The Guillotine Of Secular Exclusion? The Answer Offered By Daniel Mullen Is Embodied In “Pragmatist Philosophy.” The Researcher Relies On Classical And Neo-Pragmatist Traditions, Drawing Inspiration From Philosophers Ranging From John Dewey And William James To Richard Rorty. Pragmatist Philosophy, In Its Essence, Rejects The Traditional Philosophical Obsession With Searching For “Absolute Certainty” Or “Solid Epistemic Foundations” (Foundationalism). For Pragmatists, Truth Is Not A Fixed Metaphysical Essence That We Discover Through Pure Reason; Rather, It Is What Proves Its Utility And Effectiveness In Solving Human Problems On The Ground. From This Standpoint, Pragmatism Cares Little About The “Origin” Of An Argument (Whether Derived From A Sacred Religious Text Or A Secular Economic Theory); Rather, It Cares About The “Consequences” Of This Argument And The Results Of Its Practical Application In Public Space.

In A Highly Clever Analytical Move, The Researcher Pauses At Length With Contemporary Pragmatist Philosopher Richard Rorty. Rorty Is Considered One Of The Strongest Defenders Of Liberal Democracy, But He Became Famous For His Hostile Position Toward Introducing Religion Into Politics, Describing Religious Arguments As A “Conversation-Stopper.” Rorty Sees That When Someone Raises A Religious Argument In A Political Debate (Such As Saying: “This Law Is Rejected Because It Violates God’s Will”), Democratic Debate Halts Immediately, Because There Is No Common Ground Through Which Others Can Debate Them If They Do Not Believe In The Same God. Here, Mullen Uses “Pragmatism” To Respond To Rorty Himself, Considering That Rorty Betrayed Pragmatist Principles On This Specific Point. Mullen Argues That Excluding Religious Arguments A Priori And Categorically Is Not A Pragmatist Position, But Rather A Dogmatic Position Disguised In Liberal Garb. Genuine Pragmatist Democracy Presupposes Empirical Openness To All Languages And Vocabularies. If A Religious Argument Truly “Stops Conversation” Sometimes, Radical Secular Arguments (Such As Extreme Marxist Or Harsh Neoliberal Arguments) Can Also Stop Conversation. Pragmatism Requires Us To Let All Arguments Enter The Public Marketplace Of Ideas, Allowing Democratic Experience And Ongoing Deliberation To Filter What Is Useful From What Is Not, Rather Than Setting Up Secular Gatekeepers Who Determine In Advance Who Has The Right To Speak.

The Decisive Blow Dealt By Pragmatist Critique To Habermas Focuses On Deconstructing The Concept Of “Ideal Rational Consensus.” Habermas Sees That The Ultimate Goal Of Democratic Communication Is For All Citizens To Reach A Consensus Where They Agree Not Only On Laws, But Also On “The Same Rational Reasons” That Justify Those Laws. This Is His Primary Justification For Demanding That Religious People Abandon Their Private Reasons And Use Shared Secular Reasons. Mullen Categorically Rejects This Goal, Describing It As A Dangerous Utopian Illusion. In Any Modern Society Characterized By “Deep Pluralism,” It Is Practically And Epistemically Impossible For All Individuals To Agree On The Ultimate Philosophical Or Moral Reasons For Any Complex Issue. Citizens Hold Radically Different “Comprehensive Doctrines.” Pragmatism Tells Us That Democracy Does Not Need This Deep Epistemic Uniformity To Function Effectively. For Democracy To Succeed, It Is Sufficient For Citizens To Agree On The “Procedure” And The “Practical Outcome” (The Law Or Policy), Even If Their Reasons And Justifications Differ Radically. The Researcher Offers Illustrative Examples: A Religious Citizen Can Support An Environmental Protection Law Because The Environment Is “God’s Creation Over Which Man Was Made A Steward,” While A Secular Citizen Can Support The Same Law On Grounds Of “Public Utility And Ensuring The Survival Of Future Generations,” And A Third Citizen Can Support It Based On “Animal Rights.” They All Meet At The Point Of Agreeing On The Same Law, But Each Reached This Point Via A Completely Different Epistemic Path. Democracy Does Not Need To Melt Them All In The Crucible Of Habermasian Secular Rationality; This Practical Intersection Is Sufficient.

Based On The Foregoing, Mullen Proposes The Concept Of “Modus Vivendi” (Practical Compromise Or Practical Coexistence) As A Modest And More Realistic Alternative To Habermasian “Consensus.” Liberal Philosophers (Such As Rawls And Habermas) Often Look Disdainfully At The Term “Modus Vivendi,” Considering It Merely A Fragile Truce Between Conflicting Parties Waiting For The Right Moment To Pounce On One Another. But Mullen Re-Elevates This Concept From A Pragmatist Perspective. A Modus Vivendi Is Not Merely A Temporary Truce, But A Tremendous Democratic Achievement Resulting From Mutual Recognition Of The Difficulty And Impossibility Of Unifying Minds. It Represents Political Maturity In Which Citizens Accept Living Together And Managing Their Differences Through Voting, Bargaining, And Mutual Concessions, Without Any Party Relinquishing Its Core Language Or Spiritual Identity.

The Picture Of Critique Is Not Complete Without Addressing The Other Pole Of Contemporary Political Philosophy. In Chapter Four, Mullen Turns His Attention Toward American Philosopher John Rawls, Author Of “Political Liberalism.” Rawls And Habermas Are Considered Two Sides Of The Same Coin In Their Quest To Find A Rational Basis For The Democratic State Protecting It From Tearing Apart Due To Pluralism. Mullen Admits That Rawls’s Model Differs In Its Mechanisms From Habermas, But Shares The Same Exclusionary Purpose Toward Religion. Rawls Coined The Concept Of “Public Reason,” The Framework To Which Judges, Officials, And Citizens Must Adhere When Discussing Fundamental Constitutional Matters And Basic Questions Of Justice. Rawls Believes Citizens Must Justify Their Proposals Using Purely Political Concepts That Everyone Can “Reasonably” Accept, Keeping “Comprehensive Doctrines” (Whether Religions Or Major Secular Philosophies Like Kantianism) Away From This Sensitive Sphere. To Achieve This Stability, Rawls Proposed The Idea Of “Overlapping Consensus,” Where Each Comprehensive Doctrine Supports Liberal Political Principles From Within Its Own Perspective.

However, Rawls Faced The Same Habermasian Problem: What If A Religious Citizen Insists On Using Their Explicit Religious Language? Rawls Introduced What Is Known As “The Proviso,” Which Allows Introducing Religious Views Into Public Debate, Provided That In Due Course Sufficient Public Political Reasons Are Offered To Support What Was Proposed Religiously. Mullen Subjects This Rawlsian Model To Rigorous Pragmatist Dissection, Discovering That Rawls Practices The Same Exclusion But In A Softer Language. The Magical Tool Rawls Uses To Exclude What Does Not Suit Him Is The Concept Of “Reasonableness.” Rawls Divides Citizens And Views Into “Reasonable” And “Unreasonable.” A Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrine, In Rawls’s Dictionary, Is One That Accepts In Advance The Separation Of Religion And State And The Principles Of Political Liberalism As Defined By Him. Mullen Reveals That Rawlsian “Reasonableness” Is Not A Neutral Procedural Criterion, But A Concept Laden With Pre-Existing Secular Values. Rawls Designs The Rules Of The Political Game To Guarantee The Victory Of Secular Liberalism Before The Match Even Begins. The Religious Citizen Who Rejects This Framework (Who Believes, For Instance, That Religion Should Explicitly Guide Public Life) Is Simply Classified As “Unreasonable,” Thereby Being Removed From The Circle Of “Public Reason” And Denied Legislative Influence. Mullen’s Pragmatist Critique Asserts That Rawls’s Attempt To Create A Completely Independent And Neutral Political Language Is An Epistemically Failed Attempt, Relying On A “Hidden Epistemology” That Assumes There Is Only One Correct Way Of Political Thinking, Namely The Secular Liberal Way. Pragmatism, By Contrast, Rejects This Epistemic Monopoly, Calling For A Democracy Unafraid Of Metaphysical Or Theological Language, Leaving It To Interact Freely Under The Dome Of Practical Deliberation Focusing On Concrete Consequences And Results.

Researcher Daniel Michael Mullen Devotes Chapter Five Of His Thesis To Studying A Pivotal And Controversial Phase In Jürgen Habermas’s Intellectual Trajectory—A Phase That Witnessed At The Beginning Of The Twenty-First Century A Remarkable Revision Of His Strict Positions Toward Religion, As Habermas Termed This Updated Vision The Concept Of A “Postsecular Society.” Mullen Explains That This Shift Was Not Merely A Response To A Passing Intellectual Whim, But An Explicit Recognition Of The Collapse Of The “Empirical Secularization Thesis” That Dominated Social Philosophy For Decades. Political Realism And Global Geopolitical Developments—Particularly The Rising Role Of Religious Movements In Political Spaces Worldwide And Religion’s Transformation Into A Pivotal Element In Public Debates—Proved That Religion Did Not Recede Into The Private Sphere As Classical Enlightenment Theories Expected, Nor Did It Fade Away Before The Advance Of Scientific Rationality And Materialism.

Mullen Argues That Habermas, With His Customary Intellectual Integrity, Realized That Western Liberal Societies Had Come To Face A New Reality Requiring Mental And Institutional Adaptation To The Existence Of Vital, Active Religious Communities Resting On Firm Faith And Refusing To Vanish From The Public Arena. A “Postsecular Society” In Habermasian Definition Is Not A Society That Has Returned To Religion Or Abandoned The Pillars Of The Secular State; Rather, It Is A Society Moving Beyond The Static Vision That Considers Secularization An Inevitable Linear Trajectory Ending In The Erasure Of Faith Traditions. In This Context, Habermas’s Primary Concern Becomes The Search For A New Formula Allowing Peaceful Coexistence And National Solidarity Between Religious Citizens And Secular Citizens, Without Leading To Tearing The Fabric Of The Democratic State Or Emasculating The Public Sphere.

Researcher Daniel Mullen Pauses At Length At One Of The Most Prominent Stations Of This Habermasian Transformation, Represented By The Famous Historic Debate Held In 2004 At The Catholic Academy In Munich Between Jürgen Habermas And Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Later Pope Benedict XVI). This Debate Addressed The Issue Of “The Pre-Political Moral Foundations Of The Liberal State.” The Researcher Analyzes The Proposals Offered By Habermas In That Debate, Pointing Out That He Employed A Famous Legal And Philosophical Maxim Known As “The Böckenförde Dictum,” Named After German Constitutional Judge Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Which States That: “The Liberal Secular State Lives On Premises And Moral Assurances That It Cannot Itself Guarantee Or Produce Out Of Its Own Resources.”

Habermas Admits In This Context The Existence Of A “Motivation Crisis” And An Erosion Of Social Solidarity Within Modern Societies. Liberal Democracy Relies Completely On The Existence Of Civic Virtues, A Sense Of Responsibility, And A Willingness To Sacrifice For The Common Good On The Part Of Its Citizens. However, Neoliberal Market Rationality And Escalating Consumerist Individualism, Incapable Of Generating Solidarity Meaning, Drain The State Of This Moral And Emotional Charge. Here, Habermas Sees Religious Traditions Becoming A Vital Source And A “Reservoir Of Moral Concepts And Spiritual Inspirations” That Can Feed The Collective Conscience And Save The Secular State From Moral Aridity And Social Disintegration. Habermas Views Religion At This Stage Not As A Rational Threat To Be Fought, But As A Functional Ally Possessing A Language Rich In Images, Symbols, And The Capacity To Mobilize Solidarity And Active Citizenship.

Based On This Recognition Of The Importance Of Religion, Habermas Proposes His Developed Model Named The “Mutual Learning Process” Or “Mutual Self-Learning” Between Religious And Secular People. Researcher Mullen Analyzes The Details Of This Concept Precisely, Clarifying That Habermas Imposes A Set Of Strict Cognitive Costs And Duties On Both Parties To Ensure The Success Of Dialogue In A Postsecular Society:

First, Cognitive Duties Placed On Religious Citizens:

• Internalizing Secular Authority: Religious People Must Develop An Internal Faith Position Recognizing The Legitimacy And Neutrality Of The Secular State And The Supremacy Of Constitutional Laws.

• Adapting To Scientific Reason: Believers Must Reinterpret Their Doctrines In A Way That Does Not Clash With Modern Scientific And Technological Knowledge And Discoveries.

• Accepting Religious Pluralism: They Must Abandon Claims To An Absolute Monopoly On Moral Truth, Recognizing The Right Of Other Religions And Secular Philosophies To Equal Existence.

Second, Cognitive Duties Placed On Secular Citizens:

• Abandoning Secularist Arrogance: Habermas Demands That Secular Citizens Abandon Overbearing Secularist Arrogance That Views Religion As Primitive Superstition Destined To Disappear.

• Ceasing Epistemic Closure: Secular People Must Seriously Open Up To Religious Discourse And Attempt To Explore What “Truth-Content” Or Moral Inspirations It Might Contain That Have Not Lost Their Validity.

• Active Participation In Translation: The Burden Of Linguistic Translation Should Not Be Left On The Shoulders Of Religious People Alone; Secular People Must Contribute To And Assist In Translating Religious Moral Intuitions Into General Civic Concepts.

Although This Habermasian Shift Appears On The Surface As A Major Opening And Unprecedented Tolerance Toward Religion, Researcher Daniel Mullen Steps Forward In The Final Part Of Chapter Five To Direct Scathing Pragmatist Critique At This Model, Exposing The Illusions And Contradictions Still Inhabiting Late Habermasian Thought.

Mullen’s First Objection Concerns What He Calls The “Functionalization Of Religion.” The Researcher Argues That Habermas Does Not Accept Religion For Its Own Sake, Nor Does He Recognize The Specific Epistemic Or Existential Value Of Religious Faith As Experienced By Believers. Instead, Habermas Treats Religion As A “Wooden Moral Resource” Exploited And Drained Only To Feed The Secular State When It Fails To Mobilize Citizens. This Instrumental Treatment Views Religion As A Moral Charging Battery Rather Than An Epistemic System Holding The Right To Independently Challenge Enlightenment Rationality. For The Believer, This Habermasian Position Carries A Kind Of Implicit Hypocrisy; It Tells The Religious Person: “We Do Not Believe In The Source Of Your Beliefs Nor The Metaphysics They Rest Upon, But We Want To Use Your Spiritual And Moral Energy To Protect Our Secular Institutions.”

The Second And Dangerous Objection Highlighted Strongly By The Researcher Is That Habermas—Despite All His Arbitrary Talk About “Mutual Learning”—Never Abandoned The “Translation Proviso” As The Governing Ultimate Filter. Habermas Remains Insistent That Explicit Religious Language Is Strictly Forbidden From Entering Parliament Or Formal Legislative Institutions. “Secularism” Continues Controlling The State’s Gates, Determining What Is Rational And What Is Unrational. Mullen Believes This Contradiction Destroys The Concept Of “Epistemic Parity” Claimed By Habermas; Mutual Learning Remains Illusory As Long As The Dialogue Parties Do Not Stand On Equal Ground Regarding Linguistic Influence And Legitimacy.

From A Genuine Pragmatist Perspective, Researcher Daniel Mullen Sees That Habermas’s Alleged “Translation” Process Is Not An Equal Interaction, But A One-Sided Mandatory Task Demanding Religion Submit To The Preconditions And Assumptions Of Secular Enlightenment Rationality. Pragmatism, As Formulated By The Researcher, Indicates That Secular Rationality Itself Is Neither A Neutral Code Nor Does It Possess The Right To Install Itself As The Exclusive Judge Or Translator For Other Cultures. Habermas’s Attempt To Reduce Religion’s Spiritual Force And Translate It Conceptually Into Secular Rights Terminology Causes Religion To Lose The Essential Feature Making It Capable Of Influencing And Mobilizing In The First Place.

Mullen Emphasizes That The Title Of His Dissertation, “Democracy Without Secularism,” In No Way Means A Call To Establish An Authoritarian Theocratic State, Nor Does It Express A Desire To Merge Religious Institutions Into State Apparatuses Or Undermine The Principles Of The Rule Of Law, Freedom Of Belief, And Civic Equality. Quite To The Contrary, What The Researcher Proposes Is A Complete Abandonment Of “Epistemic And Ideological Secularism” Installing Itself As A Guardian Over Citizens’ Minds And A Gatekeeper Of Political Legislation, While Fully Retaining The Institutional And Procedural Neutrality Of The State That Ensures It Does Not Favor One Group Or Sect At The Expense Of Another. Ideological Secularism, In The Pragmatist Perspective Built By The Researcher, Has Come To Represent A Real Obstacle To Democracy Itself, Practicing Disguised Exclusion And Existential Schizophrenia Against A Wide Segment Of Society, Preventing The Public Sphere From Being Enriched By The Moral Energies And Sincere Spiritual Intuitions Stored Within Religious Traditions.

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