In The Arena Of Contemporary Islamic Thought, And Where The Waves Of Modernity Clash With The Rocks Of Heritage, The Book “The Islamic Secular” The Islamic Secular (Sherman A. Jackson), By The Thinker Sherman A. Jackson, Published By Oxford University Press, Emerges As An Attempt That Challenges Established Assumptions, Not Only In Western Academic Circles, But Even In Contemporary Islamic Consciousness, Presenting A Vision That Seeks To Liberate Concepts From Their Western Contexts, And To Resettle Them Within The Structure Of Islamic Jurisprudential Reason.
Jackson Opens His Intellectual Journey By Shedding Light On What He Calls “The Enemy Of Language” Or The Crisis Of Terminology. Inspired By The Insights Of The Famous American Writer James Baldwin And The Contemporary Moroccan Philosopher Taha Abd Al-Rahman, Jackson Deconstructs The Alienation Experienced By The Thinker When Forced To Express Himself And His Identity Using A Language And Terminology Historically Formed To Erase Or Distort This Identity. Baldwin, With His Genius, Realized That The Writer Born Within The English Language Must Realize That The Assumptions Of This Language Are In Essence An Adversary To Him, And He Must Tame And Change It. In The Same Context, Taha Abd Al-Rahman Affirms That Muslim Society Will Remain Lost In A Barren Intellectual Desert Unless It Innovates Its Own Conceptual Tools, Or Reproduces The Concepts Of Others So That They Become As If They Had Grown In Its Own Soil. Jackson Applies This Profound Vision To The Term “Secular,” Pointing Out That The Prevailing Western Understanding Imposes A Relationship Of Inevitable And Hostile Antagonism With What Is “Religious.”
However, Jackson Rejects This Epistemological Surrender, Arguing That The Islamic Jurisprudential Heritage, Specifically The Science Of Usul Al-Fiqh, Offers A Completely Alternative Approach. Jackson Does Not Seek Here Merely To Find An Arabic Equivalent For The Western Concept, But Affirms That When The Term “Secular” Is Read Through The Intellectual Background Of Islam, It Acquires A Radically Different Connotation, A Connotation That Does Not Make It An Antithesis To Religion, But Rather A Part Of Its Comprehensive System. This Alternative And Profound Concept Is What The Author Calls “The Islamic Secular.”
The Basic Hypothesis Of The Concept Of “The Islamic Secular” Rests On A Central Idea That While The Divine Perspective Of The Lord Of Islam Is A Comprehensive And Total Perspective Encompassing The Entire Universe, The Concrete And Specific Divine Communication, Which Is Manifested In “Sharia,” Is In Its Nature Limited And Framed. Based On This Conception, A Spacious Space Emerges Between The Perimeter Of Sharia With Its Drawn Boundaries, And The Perimeter Of Islam As A Comprehensive Religion. In This Interstitial “Space,” Muslims Move And Make Their Decisions Without Exclusive Reliance On Concrete Divine Dictates, But At The Same Time They Never Separate From The Deep Awareness Of God’s Presence And His Oversight And Sovereignty.
To Embody This Idea, Jackson Cites Living Historical Examples From Islamic Civilization. When The Great Ottoman Architect Sinan Designed And Built Those Edifices That Became An Architectural Signature Of Islamic Civilization, Or When Ulugh Beg Founded His Famous Astronomical Observatory In Samarkand, Neither Of Them Was Deriving His Engineering Or Astronomical Instructions Directly And Concretely From The Texts Of Sharia Or Its Jurisprudential Sources. Nevertheless, It Would Be Absurd And A Falsification Of History To Assume That Their Efforts And Creations Were Devoid Of Deep Awareness Of Divine Oversight Or The Desire To Attain Divine Satisfaction. Their Works Were “Secular” In The Sense That Divine Revelation Did Not Intervene In Determining Their Technical And Material Details, But They Remained “Religious” Works Par Excellence Because They Were Executed With A Sincere Devotional Intention And A Pure Spiritual Orientation. This Wonderful Interweaving Strikes At The Heart Of The Prevailing Western Assumption That Forcibly Separates What Is Secular From What Is Religious.
Jackson Continues To Affirm That Islam, As A Religion, Does Not Consist Of A Single Path Of Religiosity, But Consists Of Two Distinct Yet Intertwined And Inseparably Interconnected Paths. The First Path Is The “Shari” Path Which Derives Its Rules And Reference From Sharia And Its Direct Sources. The Second Path Is The “Non-Shari” Or Distinct Path, Which Is A “Secular” Path Where The Dictates Of Sharia Do Not Form Its Concrete Material Fabric. The Author Strongly Argues That Vital Activities Such As The Production Of Culture, The Development Of Technology, The Building Of Institutions, And The Making Of Daily Worldly Decisions, And Even Delving Into Purely Rational Specializations Such As Medicine And Astronomy And Economics And Engineering And Algebra, Are All Authentic Activities Deeply Rooted In Islam As A Religion. Although The Interpretive Engagement With The Texts Of Sharia Does Not Determine The Material Essence Of These Fields, They Remain At The Heart Of Islam’s Concern And Fall Under Its Broad Umbrella.
And Jackson Launches An Attack On The Conception That Portrays Sharia As A Despotic Totalitarian Entity That Intervenes In Every Minute Detail, A View Entrenched By Western Orientalism And Adopted, Unfortunately, By Some Muslims. The Author Traces The Roots Of This Misleading Conception To The Writings Of The Dutch Orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, Who Reduced Islamic Jurisprudence To An Undifferentiated Collection Of Religious Duties, Considering Them Merely Sacred Commandments Descending From Heaven, A Conception Later Adopted By Joseph Schacht And Max Weber. This View Was Built On A Naive Assumption That Sacred Law Must Have Universal Comprehensive Jurisdiction, Based On The Illusion Of Its Infinite Perfection And Comprehensiveness.
In The Face Of This, Jackson Dives Into The Comparative Philosophy Of Divine Law, Drawing On The Insights Of Christine Hayes Who Revealed The Fundamental Differences Between The Greek Understanding And The Scriptural Understanding And The Sunni Islamic Understanding Of Divine Law. While Greek Thought Saw That What Confers Divinity On Law Is Its Expression Of The Deep Structures Of A Fixed And Rational Cosmic Natural Order, And Therefore Its Absolute Comprehensiveness, Sunni Theology Took A Completely Different Path. For Sunnis, Divine Law Does Not Derive Its Sanctity From Its Correspondence With A Pre-Existing Rational Cosmic Order, But From Its Being Issued From The Singular Free And Independent Will Of God Almighty The Legislator. And If Law Emanates From A Free Will, Then This Will Can Simply And Deliberately Determine The Scope Of Its Discourse And Its Commands. The Silence Of The Lawgiver About Certain Spaces Does Not Mean That These Spaces Exit The Circle Of Divine Concern, But Leaves Them To The Space Of Human Ijtihad Governed By The Total Vision Of Religion. Here, “The Islamic Secular” Sides With The Sunni Vision That Considers Sharia A Limited And Framed Entity, Rejecting The Totalizing Greek Vision.
Jackson Also Analyzes Contemporary Trends That Attempt To Revive What Resembles “Ontological Realism” In Reading Sharia, Where Sharia Is Portrayed As A Divine Ideal Suspended In The Air, Infallible, While Fiqh Is Considered Merely A Deficient Human Attempt To Understand This Ideal. Returning To The Theorizations Of Great Jurists Such As Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Jackson Clarifies That Seeking God’s Satisfaction Is Not Always Limited To Reaching A Pre-Existing And Ideal Divine Rule. Al-Ghazali Points Out In His Usul That Many Issues Lack Definitive Evidence, And In Such Cases, “God’s Ruling” Is Considered To Be What The Mujtahid Arrives At After Exhausting His Rational Capacity. In This Brilliant Practical Sense, Al-Ghazali Dissolves The Rigid Distinctions Between Fiqh That Is Human Effort And Sharia That Is The True Divine Ruling, Making Sincerity In Research And The Process Of Ijtihad Itself Sublime Moral Values.
This Vision Concludes That Seeking To Achieve God’s Satisfaction, As Well As Seeking To Achieve Human Interests Considered Legitimate By Sharia, Are Not Strictly Confined To The Concrete And Direct Dictates Of Sharia Or Fiqh. Nevertheless, This Does Not Mean In Any Way That Muslims Must Exit The Cloak Of Islam To Achieve These Interests. The Phrase “Outside The Dictates Of Fiqh” Does Not At All Mean “Outside The Concern Of Islam,” Which Is Strongly Emphasized By “The Islamic Secular.” Rather, The Prosperity Of Sharia Itself And Its Survival As A Living Entity Across Ages Did Not Depend Only On The Efforts Of Jurists, But Required Huge Cultural And Intellectual And Institutional And Financial Support From Society, Which Sharia Did Not Provide Detailed Guidance About. From The Sponsorship Of Waqfs To The Development Of The Sciences Of Literature And Language And History, These “Non-Shari” Efforts, That Is Not Derived From The Texts Of Direct Rulings, Were A Vital Artery For The Survival Of Islam As A Civilization And Religion, Which Proves Conclusively That Activities Usually Classified As Secular Carry Within Them Great Religious And Islamic Value That Should Not Be Marginalized.
It Becomes Clear Then That Jackson’s Intellectual Project Carries Dual Dimensions, On One Hand It Refutes Western Centrality In Defining Terminology, And On The Other Hand It Addresses The Crisis Of Contemporary Islamic Consciousness Which Has Fallen Prey To A Narrow Duality That Makes It View Any Worldly Activity Not Textually Stipulated By Jurisprudence As If It Were Severed From Religion. The Exclusion Of The Concept Of “The Islamic Secular” From Both The Western Academic And The Islamic Da’wa Perspectives Has Led To Extreme Poverty In Understanding How To Implement Islam As A Way Of Life On The Material Ground Of Reality. Jackson Warns That This Neglect May Push Muslims Toward A Forced “Secularization” In The Western Sense, Where The “Religious” Is Confined To Rituals And Narrow Jurisprudential Rulings, And Everything Else Is Described As “Non-Religious,” Creating A Dangerous Civilizational Schism. Perhaps The Most Eloquent Expression Of This Is What The Author Narrated From An Imam In America Who Justified The Indifference Of Worshippers To A Huge Economic Project By Saying That “There Is No Religion In It.”
Starting From This Critical Point Represented In The Saying “There Is No Religion In It” Which Reduces Islamic Existence To A Narrow Space Of Rituals And Distances It From Its Civilizational Effectiveness, Sherman Jackson Realizes That This Epistemological Crisis Is Not Limited To The Common People Or Local Imams, But Strikes Deep At The Structure Of Western Academia That Studies Islam, And In The Ways Of Thinking Adopted By Muslim Academics Themselves In The West. Therefore, Jackson Opens A New Path To Engage With Academic Challenges, Clearly Acknowledging That His Intellectual Project Carries “Confessional” Or Sectarian Dimensions That He Is Not Ashamed Of Nor Attempts To Hide Behind A Veil Of Objectivity Or Transcendent Global Rationality. He Sees That The Exclusion Of “The Islamic Secular” From The Analytical Perspective Has Impoverished The Western Understanding Of Islam, And Pushed Contemporary Muslims To A Sharp Dual Understanding Of The Relationship Between The Religious And The Secular, An Understanding That Ultimately Serves Western Secular Hegemony. In This Context, Jackson Pauses At The Sharp Criticisms Directed By Researchers Such As Aaron Hughes At Muslim Academics In Western Universities, Where Hughes Accuses Them Of Overstepping The Boundaries Of Objective Academic Research And Engaging In “Identity Politics” And Attempting To Beautify Islam And Present It As A Comprehensive Liberal And Tolerant Religion As A Reaction To The Ideological Pressures Following The Events Of September Eleventh. Although Jackson Agrees With Hughes On The Necessity Of Maintaining Academic Integrity And Discipline, He Strongly Rejects The Idea That Western Academia Should Prevent Muslims From Contributing To Shaping The Normative Understanding Of Their Religion, Wondering Why Marxist Or Feminist Researchers Are Allowed To Theorize In Favor Of Their Affiliations While Muslims Are Deprived Of That. As A Methodological Alternative, Jackson Proposes The Concept Of “Islamic Studies 2.0” (Islamic Studies 2.0), An Approach That Combines Rigorous Critical Historical Excavation Which Forms The Core Of “Islamic Studies 1.0” (In Which Non-Muslim Researchers Can Contribute Effectively And Even Correct The Errors Of Muslim Researchers), And Employing These Historical Data To Build Contemporary Normative Positions That Meet The Needs Of Muslims And Correct Their Intellectual Trajectories.
After Establishing These Methodological Foundations, Jackson Arrives At The Depth Of The First Chapter To Dismantle The Three Components Of His Problematic Term, Beginning With The Analysis Of The Concept Of “The Secular” (The Secular) And Its Historical Development In The Western Context. Jackson Refuses To Surrender To The Epistemological Hegemony That Makes Secularism An Inevitable Antithesis To Religion, And Dissects Secularism Into Two Basic Patterns: The Macro Pattern (Macro-Secular) And The Micro Pattern (Micro-Secular). The Macro Pattern Of Secularism Refers To Those Ideologies That Target Religion In Its Entirety, Either By Actively Seeking To Uproot It From Human Life As Marxism Did, Or By Relying On The Process Of Modernization That Automatically Leads To The Withering Of Religion, Which Is Manifested In The Concept Of “Disenchantment Of The World” (Disenchantment) Theorized By Philosophers And Sociologists Such As Max Weber And Charles Taylor And Peter Berger. In This Macro Pattern, It Is Assumed That Belief In God Depends On A Cosmic Vision Teeming With Supernatural Powers And Spirits, And With The Advancement Of Positivist Science And The Natural Explanation Of Phenomena, The World Is Emptied Of Its Magic, Necessarily Leading To The Decline Of Religion And The Normalization Of Atheism. Jackson Emphatically Affirms That Islam Has Never Produced A Macro Secularism Of This Type, For The Message Of The Prophet Muhammad Peace Be Upon Him, Although It Sought To “Disenchant” The Pagan Superstitions In The Arabian Peninsula, Did Not Empty The World Of The Effectiveness Of Divine Power, But Directed Religious Sentiment Toward The Creator God Who Intervenes In History And Nature By His Free Will. And Even The Clear Qur’anic Distinction Between “Dunya” And “Akhira,” Which Was Addressed By Great Philosophers And Jurists Such As Al-Ghazali, Does Not Represent A Macro Secularism; Because Purely Worldly Activity Remains Covered By Divine Care And Oversight, And Can Be Transformed By Intention Into Worship, For Dunya As Al-Ghazali Says Is “A Farm For The Hereafter,” And Not An Antithesis To Religion.
As For The Second Pattern, Which Is The Micro Pattern (Micro-Secular), It Does Not Deny The Existence Of God Or Reject Religion In Principle, But Focuses Instead On Limiting The Scope In Which Humans Adhere To What God Says Or Commands Concretely. In This Pattern, A Certain Space Is Defined Where The Authority Of Direct Divine Commands (Taklif) Shrinks, To Make Room For Secular Ideas And Institutions To Grow, Without Necessarily Meaning The Demolition Of The Comprehensive “Sacred Canopy.” The Essence Of This Micro Secularism Lies In The Principle Of “Differentiation” (Differentiation), Which Is The Concept That Sociologists, Such As Jose Casanova, Consider The Beating Heart Of Secularization Theory, Where The Spheres Of The State And The Economy And Sciences Separate From The Religious Sphere, And Become Independent With Their Own Standards And Values. Although This Differentiation Took On A Hostile Character Toward Religion In Later Stages Of Western Modernity, Philosophers Such As Immanuel Kant Used It To Protect Religion Itself, By Confining Religion To The Circle Of “Ethics” And Differentiating It From Empirical Science.
Here Jackson Delivers His Blow, Clarifying That “The Islamic Secular” Indeed Belongs To The Family Of “Micro Secular” Because It Acknowledges The Existence Of Spaces Of Human Activity Where Sharia Or The Texts Of Revelation Do Not Determine Its Concrete Material Details Or Its Worldly Evaluation Criteria. However, A Fundamental And Decisive Difference Emerges Between Western Micro Secularism And The Islamic Secular; For While Western Differentiation Separates “The Secular” From “The Religious” And Makes Them Two Opposites, The Differentiation In The Islamic Perspective Separates The “Non-Shari” Space (That Is Which Is Not Governed By Direct Text Or Jurisprudential Analogy) From The “Shari” Space, And Not From Religion Itself. And Since “The Shari” Does Not Necessarily Coincide With The Boundaries Of Islam As A Religion, This Differentiation Creates A Vast Space That Remains Outside The Direct Dictates Of Sharia, And Yet Remains Entirely Within The Boundaries Of Islam As A Religion, And This Gives Us A Concept That May Seem Contradictory At First Glance To The Western Mind, Which Is The Concept Of “The Religious Secular.”
To Deepen This Distinction, Jackson Moves To Dissect The Concept Of “Religion” (Religion) Itself, Expressing His Astonishment At The Semantic Confusion Surrounding This Term In Western Thought. Jackson Reviews The Historical Debate About The Latin Origin Of The Word, Pointing To The Discrepancy Between The View Of The Roman Philosopher Cicero Who Considered Religion A “Psychological State” Or An Internal Orientation Characterized By Awe And Constant Anxiety To Regulate The Relationship With The Gods (Religion-As-Psychodynamic-Orientation), And The View Of The Christian Writer Lactantius Who Formulated Religion As A System Of Specific And Concrete Doctrines And Rituals That Connect Man To The True God (Religion-As-Concrete-Doctrine-And-Practice). Jackson Clarifies That European Intellectual Elites In The Modern Era Adopted The Viewpoint Of Lactantius, So They Transformed Religion Into A “Thing” Or A Concrete Structural System Easy To Target And Separate From Other Spheres Of Life Such As Economy And Politics. And When Orientalists Turned To Study Islam, They Projected This Crystallized Western Understanding Onto The Term “Religion” Islamic, Reducing It To A Set Of Strict Commands And Prohibitions, That Is “Sharia,” Making It The Totalitarian Entity That Leaves No Detail Unaddressed. This Reduction Was Not Limited To Orientalists, But Was Unfortunately Adopted By Many Pioneers Of Islamic Reform And Contemporary Political Islam Movements, Who Saw In This Totalitarian Understanding Of Sharia The Only Lifeline To Resist The Western Secular Flood.
However, Jackson Strongly Rejects This Reduction, Drawing On The Insights Of The Japanese Researcher Toshihiko Izutsu And Great Muslim Scholars Such As Al-Ghazali And Ibn Taymiyya And Al-Shatibi, To Affirm That The Term “Religion” In Islam Is A Polysemic Term (Polysemic) Carrying Within It Beautiful Apparent Contradictions, For It Means “Submissive Obedience” From The Human Side, And Means “Absolute Sovereignty” From The Side Of God. And More Important Than That, Religion In Islam Is Not Forcibly Separated Into “Internal Faith” And “External Practice” As Two Contradictories, But Combines Both Paths In An Integrated Whole. While Sharia Represents The Dimension Represented In System And Doctrine And Concrete Practice, “Religion” In The Concept Of “The Islamic Secular” Represents The Deep Psychological Orientation, And The Sensing Of Continuous Divine Presence, And Awareness Of The Total Oversight Of The Lord Of The Worlds. This Dimension Which Depends Mainly On The Concept Of “Taqwa” And The Motive Of “Qurba” To God, Makes The Muslim Move In Diverse Life Spaces (Which Are Not Governed By Detailed Jurisprudential Texts) With A Vital Religious Consciousness. This Consciousness Expands The Horizon Of Religion To Go Beyond Mere Literal Compliance With Commands (Obedience / Obedience) To What Jackson Calls (Submission Or Spiritual Compliance / Obeisance), Where The Believer Seeks To Attain God’s Satisfaction Even In Fields Where No Specific Guidance Has Been Revealed. Thus, Any “Secular” Or Worldly Activity Not Textually Stipulated By Sharia, Whether It Is Building Institutions, Or Developing Technologies, Or Formulating Scientific Theories, Becomes A “Religious” And Islamic Activity Par Excellence, As Long As It Is Practiced Under The Umbrella Of Taqwa And The Continuous Striving To Seek God’s Satisfaction, Which Demolishes The Western Duality That Makes Secularism Necessarily A Negation Of Religion, And Opens A Wide Door For A New Understanding Of Islamic Civilizational Effectiveness.
Complementing This And After He Liberated The Concept Of “Religion” From Its Western Captivity And Linked It To Consciousness And Purpose, He Moves To The Third And Final Component Of His Term, Which Is The Concept Of “Islamic” (Islamic). Jackson Begins This Approach With A Linguistic And Conceptual Clarification Of Utmost Importance, Distinguishing Between The Two Adjectives “Muslim” (Muslim) And “Islamic” (Islamic) When Used As Adjectives For Actions And Ideas. While The Adjective “Muslim” Carries A Descriptive Reportive Character Telling Us What Exists In Reality, The Adjective “Islamic” Carries A Normative Character Directing Us Toward What Should Be And What Is Hoped For As An Ideal. To Clarify This Difference, The Author Points Out That It Is Linguistically And Realistically Easy To Talk About “A Murder Committed By A Muslim” Or “Adultery Committed By A Muslim,” But It Is Starkly Contradictory To Talk About “An Islamic Murder” Or “Islamic Adultery.” Based On This, Jackson Refuses To Settle For The Term “The Muslim Secular” As An Alternative To His Term, Because Any Worldly Act Does Not Become Islamic Merely Because Its Doer Embraces Islam; Rather This Act Needs That Spiritual Charge Of Taqwa, And The Motive Of Qurba, And “Obeisance” Conscious Of Divine Oversight, To Transform From A Merely Neutral Secular Activity Into An Activity That Falls Under The Umbrella Of “The Islamic Secular.” Cheering For A Sports Team Such As The Pakistani National Team In A Cricket Match, For Example, May Be Merely A Purely Secular Nationalist Act, But If Coupled With The Intention Of Enhancing The Prestige Of Muslims And Supporting Their Cultural Structure And Their Self-Confidence, Then It Acquires The Normative Character And Becomes A Genuinely “Islamic” Act.
This Understanding Of The Term “Islamic” Was Not Born Of The Moment For Jackson, But Is The Fruit Of Intellectual Development And Courageous Retraction From Previous Positions He Adopted In His Early Writings. The Author Acknowledges That In His Beginnings He Carried An Explicit And Justified Hostility To The Loose Use Of The Adjective “Islamic,” Influenced In That By Salafi Tendencies And Academic Approaches, Such As Those Adopted By The Well-Known Historian Marshall Hodgson And The Thinker Ismail Al-Faruqi, Which Were Approaches That Restricted The Launching Of The Description “Islamic” Exclusively To What Is Purely Religious And Directly Derived From Foundational Scriptural Texts. Jackson At That Time Saw That Launching The Term “Islamic” On Certain Cultural And Historical Choices Grants The Immigrant Elites In The West The Authority To Monopolize Religious Normativity And Marginalize The Specific Experience Of Native Muslims (Such As Black Americans). However, Jackson Later Realized The Shortcoming Of This View, Especially When Confronted With The Complex Reality Required By The Survival Of Religions And The Continuity Of Their Civilizational Effectiveness. Here, Jackson Borrows The Concept Of “Plausibility Structure” (Plausibility Structure) From The Sociologist Peter Berger, To Clarify That Religion Does Not Have The Ability To Sustain Itself In A Cultural Vacuum, But Needs An Integrated Cultural And Social Ecosystem That Makes It Alive And Convincing And Realistic For Successive Generations. From This Standpoint, Elements Of Culture And Arts And Architecture, Such As Domes And Minarets And Even Local Foods Associated With Identity, Become Integral Parts Of The “Islamic” Entity As A Whole, Not Because They Are Stipulated In The Usul Of Sharia, But Because They Constitute The Cultural And Symbolic Incubator That Preserves The Survival Of Religion And Grants It Its Attractiveness And Credibility In Lived Reality.
And From The Gateway Of This New Awareness, Jackson Enters Into A Critical Engagement With Two Of The Most Prominent Who Tried To Define The Term “Islamic” In Western Academia, Starting With The Eminent Historian Marshall Hodgson In His Famous Encyclopedia “The Venture Of Islam.” Hodgson Had Proposed A Famous Tripartite Division: “Islamic” (Islamic) To Refer To The Pure Religion Derived From Revelation, And “Islamicate” (Islamicate) To Refer To The Culture And Civilization Produced By Muslim Societies And In Which Non-Muslims Effectively Participated, And “Islamdom” (Islamdom) To Refer To The Geographical And Political Field Dominated By Muslims. Although Jackson Appreciates This Division For Its Analytical Ability To Distinguish Between What Is Textual Shari And What Is Not, He Faults Hodgson For His Severe Narrowing Of The Concept Of “Religion”; Where Hodgson Confined The Religious To The Individual Moral Response To The Challenge Of Revelation, Considering All Cultural And Civilizational And Artistic Achievements (Islamicate) As “Secular” Activities That Have No Essential Connection To Religion In The Precise Sense. Jackson Strongly Opposes This Arbitrary Separation, Affirming That All Cultural And Literary And Institutional Activities That Work To Maintain And Strengthen Religion Must Be Considered “Religious” And “Islamic” Activities In Their Essence, Because They Contribute To Keeping Religion Alive And Effective, And Therefore That Artificial And Unjust Gulf That Hodgson Dug Between What Is Religious And What Is Cultural Or Secular Dissolves. Considering Culture And Civilization As Merely A “Secular” Non-Religious Product Means Stripping Islam Of Its Ability To Shape Life And Form The Human Being, Which Contradicts The Formative Nature Of Islam.
Then Jackson Moves To Contend With The Thesis Of The Late Thinker Shahab Ahmed In His Huge And Controversial Tome “What Is Islam?”. Shahab Ahmed Tried To Escape From The Grip Of “Legal Supremacy” Of The Jurists By Expanding The Concept Of Islam To Include Philosophy And Sufism And Art, Considering That These Fields Produce Real Islamic Meanings And Truths. And To Avoid Falling Into The (Religious And Secular) Duality Imposed By Western Modernity, Shahab Ahmed Claimed That These Artistic And Philosophical Practices Are Neither Religious Nor Secular, But Simply Transcend This Classification To Become “Islamic” Only. Jackson Sees That Shahab Ahmed Exaggerated In His Conception Of The Comprehensiveness Of Fiqh And The Domination Of Jurists, And As A Result, Went Far In Inventing Nebulous Concepts Such As “Pre-Text” (Pre-Text) To Justify The Departure Of Philosophers And Sufis From The Rulings Of Sharia Under The Pretext Of Their Reaching A Higher Cosmic “Truth” Than The Qur’anic Text Itself, And Independent Of Revelation. Jackson Strongly Criticizes This Extreme “Ontological Realism” That Makes Cosmic Truth Preceding God’s Will And Independent Of It, Affirming That The Sunni Islamic Vision Does Not Recognize An Independent Metaphysical Truth That Can Cancel Or Transcend God’s Direct Revelation, And That Considering The Contributions Of Aristotle And Plato As “Islamic” Directly Without Passing Them Through The Sieve Of Islamic Acceptance Is A Flawed Simplification. And Instead Of Inventing Convoluted Ways To Circumvent Sharia And Break Its Textual Sovereignty As Shahab Ahmed Did, “The Islamic Secular” Offers A Simpler And More Authentic And Consistent Solution With Heritage: Acknowledging That Sharia Itself Sets Limits To Its Powers And Announces Areas Where It Does Not Intervene, And That There Are Complete Worldly And Rational Fields That Fall Outside The Scope Of Shari Obligation, But They Remain Quite Comfortably Within The Broad Islamic Scope As A Religion, Where These Fields Are Governed By Criteria Of Efficiency And Benefit And Beauty And Effectiveness And Not Necessarily By The Strict Jurisprudential Criteria Of Halal And Haram.
And In Order To Prove That This Understanding Is Not Merely An Abstract Philosophical Theorizing Living In Ivory Academic Towers, But Is A Deeply Rooted Reality Practiced In The Heart Of Jurisprudential And Historical Heritage, Jackson Opens The Second Chapter Of His Book With A Revealing And Exciting Historical Story From The Mamluk Era, Its Hero The Prominent Historian And Jurist And Muhtasib Taqi Al-Din Al-Maqrizi. At The Beginning Of The Ninth Century Hijri, Egypt Was Struck By A Crushing Economic Crisis As A Result Of The Scarcity Of Silver Mines Locally And Its Scarcity In Global Markets, Which Prompted The Mamluk Sultan Faraj Ibn Barquq To Make A Radical Change In Monetary Policy, Represented In Issuing Decrees Relying On Minting Copper Coins (Fulus) To Be The Basic And Standard Currency In Daily Transactions. This Decision, Accompanied By Political Disturbances And The Monopolization Of Precious Metals, Led To Terrible Inflation And A Catastrophic Collapse In Purchasing Power, Which Threatened The Entire Egyptian Society With Extreme Poverty And Bankruptcy. In The Face Of This Economic And Social Catastrophe, Al-Maqrizi Did Not Content Himself With Describing This Policy As A Failed Or Administratively Corrupt Economic Policy, But Rather Proceeded From His Position As A Shafi’i Jurist To Confer Upon It A Decisive Religious Ruling, Considering That Reliance On Copper As A Monetary Currency Is A Matter “Forbidden By Sharia” And A Heinous Innovation, And Contrary To The Natural Shari System Which He Claimed Is Limited Exclusively To Gold And Silver.
Here Sherman Jackson Places His Finger On The Methodological Flaw Committed By Al-Maqrizi, Which Is The Arbitrary And Dangerous Confusion Between What Is “Bad Or Economically Failed” And What Is “Forbidden Or Prohibited By Sharia.” Jackson Reveals, Based On The Opinions Of Great Jurists Contemporary And Subsequent To Al-Maqrizi, Such As Al-Ayni And Al-Suyuti And Even Al-Ramli And Al-Ansari, That Dealing With Copper Fulus As Currency Was A Matter Permissible By Sharia By Consensus Of Jurists, And That Sharia Never Prohibited It But Permitted It To Facilitate Transactions. The Real Problem Was Never In The Legitimacy Of Using Fulus From The Abstract Jurisprudential Point Of View, But In The Economic Efficiency Of The Mamluk Monetary Policy And The Way It Managed The Exchange Rate. Al-Maqrizi’s Sincere Excitement And His Praiseworthy Jealousy For The Public Good Blinded Him From Realizing A Fundamental Truth: Which Is That Islamic Sharia Does Not Possess, And Has Never Claimed That It Possesses, Technical Answers Or Detailed Mathematical Equations To Solve Economic Crises And Determine Monetary Policies. Knowing The Shari Ruling Of “Permissibility” Or “Permissibility” Of Dealing With A Certain Currency Does Not Mean In Any Way That This Dealing Will Be “Useful” Or “Efficient” Or “Righteous” From A Practical Point Of View In Specific Economic Circumstances. This Historical Incident Clearly Illuminates The Decisive And Methodological Difference Between The Moral Or Jurisprudential Standard That Determines Permissibility And Prohibition, And The Practical Or Utilitarian Standard That Determines Efficiency And Success, Which Proves That Sharia With Its Stipulated Rulings Does Not Cover Everything In Existence, And That There Is An Urgent Need For Purely Worldly And Secular Sciences (Such As Economics And Administration And Medicine And Engineering) To Regulate The Movement Of Life, And These Sciences Fall Clearly Outside The Scope Of Direct Dictates Of Revelation Texts.
This Brilliant Truth Is Confirmed And Entrenched In Usuli Consciousness Through The Profound Golden Maxim Formulated By Imam Shihab Al-Din Al-Qarafi, The Brilliant Maliki Jurist And Prominent Usuli Scholar, When He Decided In A Concise And Decisive Phrase That “The Good Is Broader Than The Shari Ruling.” This Pivotal Usuli Principle Means That The Circle Of Righteousness And Benefit And Goodness In Human Life Is A Circle Much Broader And More Spacious Than The Narrow Circle Covered By Direct Taklifi Jurisprudential Rulings (Obligation, Prohibition, Recommendation, Dislike, Permissibility). Mere Literal And Abstract Adherence To Strict Jurisprudential Rules Does Not Necessarily Represent In Every Context All The Normative Practice Required In Islam To Ensure Happiness In Both Worlds, But Rather A Spacious Space Must Be Left Where Human Expertise And Human Experience And Practical Rationality Move To Assess Consequences And Achieve Real Interests. And Jackson Strikes A Contemporary And Practical Example To Understand This Precise Mechanism, For While Sharia Decisively Decides The Right Of A Woman To Request Annulment Of Marriage From The Judge Due To The Husband’s Insolvency And His Inability To Provide Maintenance, This Shari Ruling (Permissibility) Does Not Necessarily Guarantee That The Decision Of Annulment Is The Best Or Most Beneficial Or Most Stable Option For That Woman In A Specific Individual And Social Case. Determining What Is “Good” Or “Efficient” Practically And In Life Requires In Many Cases Exiting The Circle Of Abstract Shari Ruling With Its Moral And Legal Dimension, To The Spacious Realm Of Worldly Specializations Such As Financial Expertise, And Social Care, And Broad Sharia-Oriented Policy, And This Spacious And Relatively Independent Space Is Exactly The Vital Scope In Which “The Islamic Secular” Moves And Grows Through As A Conceptual And Practical Framework.
And Sherman Jackson Proceeds To Establish Rational And Transmitted Evidence For This Epistemological Limitation Of The Jurist, Evoking A Precise Usuli Discussion About The Extent To Which Two Shari Rulings Can Be Equal In The Rank Of “Permissibility” With Their Practical And Material Consequences Radically Diverging, Citing In That The Famous Incident Of Al-Isra And Al-Mi’raj When The Prophet Muhammad Peace Be Upon Him Was Given The Choice Between Drinking From The Cup Of Wine And The Cup Of Milk, So He Chose Milk By Fitra, To Be Informed By Revelation Represented In Gabriel Peace Be Upon Him That If He Had Chosen Wine His Ummah Would Have Gone Astray And Strayed From The Straight Path. Imam Al-Qarafi Comments On This Pivotal Incident Clarifying With Usuli Intelligence That Both Options (Wine And Milk) Were At That Moment And Before The Prohibition Of Wine Completely Permissible From The Point Of View Of Pure Shari Ruling, As No Ruling Prohibiting Wine Had Yet Been Revealed, But The Consequences And Results Entailed By The Act, Which Revelation Was Aware Of And Informed About, Fall Within A Broader Circle Not Controlled Or Determined By Shari Ruling Alone. This Differentiation Between Determining The “Legal Status” Or Legislative Status Of The Act (Which Is The Shari Ruling), And Evaluating The “Practical And Historical And Material Consequences” Resulting From Its Implementation (Which Is A Space Left To Secular Human Expertise And To The Higher Purposes Of Religion), Represents A Blow To The Narrative Of “Absolute Legal Supremacy” Of Jurists Criticized By Western Secularism And Which Monopolizes Islamic Truth And Effectiveness In The Garb Of Strict Fiqh Alone. This Fundamental Distinction.
Based On This Distinction Between What Is Shari And What Is Non-Shari, Sherman Jackson Dives Into The Historical Depth Of The Science Of Usul Al-Fiqh, To Trace The Evolutionary Path That This Fundamental Concept Has Traversed, Proving That The Boundaries Of Sharia Were Not Imposed On It From Outside As Happened With Religion In Modern West, But Were Self-Imposed Boundaries That The Jurists Of Islam And Its Usulis Themselves Set And Acknowledged. Jackson Begins This Historical Analysis By Standing At The Early Theses In Islamic Jurisprudence, Where Sharia Appeared In The Writings Of The First Generation As If It Were An Absolute Entity With No Limits. This Orientation Clearly Manifested In The “Risala” Of Imam Al-Shafi’i Who Decided That No Incident Befalls Anyone Among The People Of The Religion Of God Except That In The Book Of God There Is Evidence Of The Path Of Guidance Therein, A Saying Later Relied Upon By Ibn Surayj And The Early Commentators To Say That The Actions Of Servants Are All Not Devoid Of A Shari Ruling. This Early Proposition Intersects With The Interpretation Presented By The Eminent Academic George Makdisi, Who Saw In Shafi’i Usul Al-Fiqh An Attempt By The People Of Hadith And Conservatives To Confront The Mu’tazilites And Rationalists, By Affirming The Sufficiency Of The Text And Its Absolute Comprehensiveness For All Incidents And Events Without Need For External Rational Sources. However, Jackson Sees That This Early Vision, Despite Its Brilliance, Did Not Settle As A Final Say In The Course Of Usuli Development, But The Following Centuries Witnessed A Pivotal And Qualitative Transformation Toward Defining The Features Of The Shari Ruling And Drawing Its Governing Boundaries With Unambiguous Clarity.
This Historical Transformation Begins To Appear Clearly With The Late Fourth Century Hijri And The Beginning Of The Fifth Century, When Usulis Began To Include In Their Classifications Precise And Exclusive Definitions Of Fiqh And Shari Ruling Distinguishing It From Other Rational And Empirical Knowledge. In This Context, Judge Ibn Al-Qassar Al-Maliki Emerges In His Usuli Introduction, Where He Differentiated Between Determining The Shari Ruling As A Usuli Issue Entrusted To The Jurist, And Determining The “Incident” As A Geographical Or Sensory Issue That Exits The Jurisdiction Of The Jurist As A Jurist, Such As The Issue Of Determining The Decline Of The Sun To Know The Time Of Prayer; As Any Non-Specialized Person Can Know It With His Senses Without Need To Imitate The Jurist. Then This Methodological Distinction Crystallizes In A More Mature Form With Judge Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani In His Definition Of Fiqh As Knowledge Of Shari Rulings Without Rational Ones, Clarifying That Knowledge Of Shari Rulings Does Not Require Knowledge Of Rational Rulings Such As The Science Of Medicine And Engineering And Grammar And Language. And Imam Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali Crowns In His Book “Al-Mustasfa” This Epistemological Path With His Eternal Definition Of Shari Ruling As “The Discourse Of The Lawgiver Related To The Actions Of The Mukallafin,” Emphasizing His Famous Phrase That “Where This Discourse Does Not Exist There Is No Shari Ruling.” Al-Ghazali Clarifies That Sharia Does Not Intervene With Its Detailed Texts To Prove Rational Sciences Or Deny Them, But Leaves Them To Their Own Fields, Warning Against “The Ignorant Friends Of Islam” Who Fight Rational And Empirical Sciences Under The Pretext Of Defending Religion. Rather, Al-Ghazali Goes Further When He Rouses The Enthusiasm Of Muslims To Train In Medicine And Worldly Sciences, Considering Them Among The Communal Obligations That Religion Values, Although Their Material Essence Is Not Derived From The Texts Of Sharia. And Hanbali Jurists Such As Judge Abu Ya’la And Ibn Aqil Participated In This Orientation, So They Confined Fiqh To Shari Rulings Of The Mukallafin And Excluded From It Medicine And Philosophy And Astronomy.
However, The Major Turning Point In The History Of The Science Of Usul Al-Fiqh, According To Jackson, Was Achieved At The Hands Of Imam Fakhr Al-Din Al-Razi In His Unique Book “Al-Mahsul Fi Ilm Usul Al-Fiqh.” The Brilliant Organizational Innovation Of Al-Razi Was Represented In His Being The First To Gather The Scattered Taklifi Rulings (Obligation, Prohibition, Recommendation, Dislike, Permissibility) And Wadi’ Rulings (Cause, Condition, Preventer) And Formulate From Them A Single Composite And Specific Concept That Is “The Shari Ruling.” This Methodological Gathering Put An End To Loose Uses, And Made Sharia Defined As A Cognitive Structure Confined To The Sum Of These Composite Rulings. And By Defining Shari Ruling As A Basic Building Unit Of Sharia, The Dividing Boundaries Between What Is Shari And What Is Non-Shari Became Drawn With Utmost Precision. And This Foundational Innovation Allowed Later Jurists To Refute Any Claim That Confuses God’s Cosmic Creation Of Things With His Legislative Discourse; Which Was Manifested In Shihab Al-Din Al-Qarafi’s Response To The Jurist Al-Najm Al-Namshawani Who Claimed That Everything In The World Is Shari Because God Is Its Creator And Legislator, So Al-Qarafi Responded To Him That God’s Creation Of Things (Cosmic Command) Differs From His Taklifi Discourse (Shari Command), For Not Everything That God Created In The Universe Necessarily Carries A Taklifi Or Wadi’ Shari Ruling.
And This Usuli Theory Reached The Peak Of Its Maturity And Completion At The Hands Of Imam Shihab Al-Din Al-Qarafi, Who Built On The Theorizations Of Al-Razi And Wove What Jackson Calls The “Pure-Law Model” (Pure-Law Model). Al-Qarafi Added To The Definition Of Shari Ruling His Decisive Phrase “Or What Necessitates The Establishment Of A Ruling Or Its Negation” To Accommodate Causes And Conditions And Preventers Completely, And Deduced An Unprecedented Usuli Distinction Between “Evidence Of Legitimacy” From Which The Jurist Derives The Universal Shari Ruling, And “Evidence Of Occurrence” Sensory And Empirical With Which Material Reality Is Proven. Al-Qarafi Revealed That Evidence Of Legitimacy Is Confined To Known Jurisprudential Sources, While Evidence Of Occurrence Is Unlimited And Depends On Medicine And Engineering And Arithmetic And Custom And Senses. Accordingly, Al-Qarafi Decided That Decisions Of The Ruler Or The Jurist In Strategic Matters Such As War Plans Or Economic Measures Do Not Carry Binding Shari Authority Merely Because They Were Issued By A Jurist, Because Their Source Is Worldly Expertise And Not Deduction From Revelation. And This Precise Usuli Distinction Continued In The Literature Of Later Jurisprudential Schools, As We Find With Ibn Al-Hajib, And Sadr Al-Sharia Al-Mahbubi And Al-Taftazani From The Hanafis, Up To Ibn Abidin In The Modern Era, And Sheikh Wahba Al-Zuhayli Who Affirmed In His Modern Classifications That Shari Ruling Exits From Its Domain Sensory And Rational And Medical And Engineering Knowledge, Which Confirms That Saying There Is A Non-Shari Secular Space Within Religion Is An Authentic Origin In Islamic Usuli Thought And Not A Strange Intruder Upon It.
In This Context, Jackson Confronts The Internal Methodological Challenges That May Be Raised Against His Thesis From Within Islamic Heritage Itself, Distinguishing Between His Project And Two Prominent Orientations: Sharia Minimalism (Shari’ah Minimalism) Among The Zahiris, And Sharia Maximalism (Shari’ah Maximalism) Among Ibn Taymiyya And Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya. The Minimum Manifests In Ibn Hazm Al-Zahiri In His Negation Of Qiyas And Narrowing The Sources Of Legislation To Limit The Scope Of Decisive Rulings And Considering Everything Not Textually Stipulated As Excused Or Permissible; However, Jackson Clarifies That “The Islamic Secular” Does Not Aim To Narrow Sharia Or Abolish Qiyas As The Zahiris Do, But Works Even Within The Boundaries Regulated By Sharia Through Exploring The Lower Spaces Existing Under Shari Ruling, And Gives Non-Shari Activity A Religious And Positive Value As A Quest To Seek God’s Satisfaction, Which Is Overlooked By The Dry Zahiri Proposition. And On The Opposite Bank, The Greater Challenge Represented In “Sharia Maximalism” Among Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya And His Teacher Ibn Taymiyya Emerges, Where Ibn Al-Qayyim Sought In His Writings Such As “Al-Turuq Al-Hukmiyya” To Expand The Concept Of Sharia To Accommodate Everything That Achieves Justice, Declaring His Famous Saying: “Wherever The Signs Of Justice Appear Then There Is God’s Sharia And His Religion,” With The Aim Of Closing The Door To Authoritarian Encroachment Of Non-Shari Politics. However, Jackson Clarifies That Ibn Al-Qayyim Himself Did Not Abolish The Fundamental Difference Between What Is Explicitly Stipulated By Sharia And What Conforms To Sharia And Does Not Contradict It, As Ibn Taymiyya In Turn, Despite His Offensive Campaign Against Philosophy And Theologians And His Expansion Of The Concept Of Sharia To Include Doctrines, Distinguishes Precisely Between Cosmic Will And Shari Will, And Explicitly Acknowledges That There Are Knowledges And Industries Such As Medicine And Arithmetic And Agriculture And Construction That Fall Outside The Direct Scope Of Shari Discourse, And That Knowledge Of Material Reality (Understanding Reality) Is A Main Condition For The Sound Application Of Shari Ruling.
Establishing These Solid Theoretical Foundations, Jackson Moves In The Third Chapter To Address The Practical And Conceptual Applications Of “The Islamic Secular” Under The Title “Islam Beyond Shari Ruling.” Jackson Opens Fire On The Dystopian Narrative (Dystopian Narrative) That Dominated The Study Of The History Of Islamic Law In Western And Eastern Academia, Which Portrays The History Of Fiqh As A Continuous Path Of Collapse And Rigidity And Separation From Reality As A Result Of Jurisprudential Rigidity. Jackson Reveals That This Crisis Assessment Returns To A Grave Confusion Between The Concept Of “Sharia” And The Concept Of “Islamic Law”; For Islamic Law In Actual History Was Never Confined One Day To Pure Shari Fiqh, But Included In Its Bowels Legal And Administrative Apparatuses And Organizations That Were Considered “Legal” And Had Binding And Punitive Authority Without Their Essential Material Being Derived From The Texts Of Taklifi Fiqh, Such As The Rulings Of Sharia-Oriented Policy, And The Diwan Of Grievances, And The System Of Hisba. Muslim Jurists And Historians Long Ago Realized That These Parallel Systems Manage Worldly Spaces Efficiently And Are Based On Interest And Justice Without Being Considered An Exit From Islam, And That Accusing These Systems Of Apostasy Or Western Secularism Results From Inability To Understand The Flexibility Of The Islamic Scientific Field.
And Jackson Arrives At A Conclusion Addressing The Illusion Of Considering “Jurisprudential Ijtihad” The Only And Sole Way Out Of The Crises Of The Islamic Ummah. Jackson Clarifies That The Deficiency From Which Muslims Suffer In The Modern Era Is Not A Deficiency In Producing Shari Jurisprudential Rulings, But Is A Material And Intellectual And Technological And Economic And Cultural Deficiency; And Jurisprudential Ijtihad (Shari Ijtihad) However Strong It May Be Will Produce Nothing But Shari Rulings (Halal, Haram, Obligatory), But It Will Not Innovate An Efficient Economic Theory, Nor Will It Design An Advanced Weapon, Nor Will It Build A Successful Administrative Institution, Nor Will It Produce Elegant Literature And Art That Preserves For The Ummah Its Plausibility And Its Self-Confidence. Islamic Sharia In Its History Did Not Depend On The Efforts Of Jurists Alone, But Was Nourished And Based On Non-Shari Creativity – That Is Islamic Secular – Which Was Created By Scientists And Engineers And Traders And Writers And Administrators. Hence, Confining The Hoped-For Solution In “Ijtihad” Alone Is Shortsightedness That Overlooks The Pivotal Role Played By The Islamic Secular Space In Maintaining The Plausibility Structure Of Islam And Preserving Its Prestige And Effectiveness In The Modern World.
*The Published Opinions Do Not Necessarily Represent The Opinion Of Nile Post.
