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Intimate Rivals :China In Japan

In Tokyo, China Does Not Seem Like A Distant Country. She Is Present Everywhere, In The Small Neighborhood Shop Where Imported Vegetables Are Sold, And In A Factory Waiting For A Shipment Of Spare Parts From Shanghai, And In A Small Fishing Port In Okinawa Whose Sailors Watch The Horizon With Anxiety, And In The Parliament Hall Where Her Name Becomes An Electoral Card, And In An Old Mourning House Where The Name Of A Soldier Who Died In Manchuria Eighty Years Ago Still Remains. This Daily Presence, Intimate And Confusing At The Same Time, Is The Point From Which The American Researcher Sheila A. Smith Starts In Her Book Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics And A Rising China, Published By Columbia University Press In 2015 Within The Council On Foreign Relations Book Series, To Tell Us Something That Seems Simple But Turns Many Assumptions Upside Down: What Determines Japan’s Relationship With China Is Not Only What Happens In The East China Sea Or In The Halls Of The United Nations Or In The Calculations Of Great Power Balances, But What Happens Inside Japan Itself, In Its Kitchens And Its Farms And Its Ports And Its Courts Of Memory And Its Bureaucratic Offices And Its Party Conflicts.

The Book Is Not A Book About China As Much As It Is A Book About Japan As It Looks At China, And Fears It, And Needs It, And Trades With It, And Quarrels With It, And Then Returns In The Evening To Argue With Itself About It. And For This Reason Smith Chose A Title That Carries Within It A Paradox That Cannot Be Ignored, For The Rivalry Here Is Not The Rivalry Of Strangers Who Do Not Know Each Other, But The Rivalry Of Close People Who Know Each Other More Than They Should, Whose Interests Have Become So Intertwined That It Has Become Difficult For Them To Separate, And It Has Also Become Difficult For Them To Reconcile. It Is The Intimacy Of The Neighbor With Whom You Share The Wall And The Well And The Memory, And The Rivalry Of A History Whose Account Has Not Yet Been Settled. And From This Paradox The Author Weaves A Political And Social And Economic Narrative Extending From The Normalization Of Relations In 1972 To The Crisis Of The Disputed Islands At The Beginning Of The Second Decade Of The Twenty-First Century, Passing Through The Crises Of Food And Memory And Fishing, To Reveal How Every Major External File With Beijing Was In Reality A Small Internal File In Japan, Or Became Through Domestic Politics A Large File.

And Sheila Smith Is A Senior Fellow At The Council On Foreign Relations In New York, And She Spent Many Long Years Studying Japanese Politics And Japanese Society From Within, Mastering Its Language And Following Its Local Newspapers And Sitting With Its Fishermen And Its Farmers And Its Officials. And This Is What Gives Her Book A Different Taste From The Books Of International Relations That Are Usually Written From Above, From The Height Of Warplanes And Aircraft Carriers And Maps Of Influence. For Smith Comes Down To The Ground, And Enters The Narrow Electoral Districts, And Listens To The Complaints Of Fishermen’s Associations, And Traces The Effect Of A Shipment Of Poisoned Gyoza On The Mood Of Consumers, And Reads The Minutes Of The Meetings Of The Liberal Democratic Party, And Understands That A Decision In Foreign Policy May Sometimes Be Taken Not Because Beijing Did Something, But Because A Parliamentarian Fears Losing His Seat In The Next Elections, Or Because A Ministry Wants To Protect Its Powers, Or Because A Small Civil Association Decided That It Will No Longer Remain Silent.

The Central Question That Poses Itself In The First Pages Of The Book, And Continues To Pursue The Reader Until The Last Page, Is A Question That At First Glance Seems Purely Economic: How Can Two Countries Linked By Trade And Investment Relations That Are Among The Deepest In The World Slip Repeatedly To The Edge Of Confrontation? For Japan And China, As Smith Reminds Us, Built During Three Decades What Resembles A Shared Economic Miracle. Japanese Companies Invested In China Without Hesitation, And Transferred To It Their Factories And Their Technologies, And Opened To It Their Markets, And Found In It Cheap Labor And A Promising Consumer Market. And In Return, China Found In Japan An Indispensable Partner For Its Modernization, And A Source Of Technology And Capital And Administrative Experience. And The Volume Of Trade Exchange Reached Astronomical Figures That Made The Two Countries Partners Neither Of Whom Could Dispense With The Other Without Paying A Heavy Price. And The Classical Liberal Theory In International Relations Told Us That This Deep Economic Interdependence Would Be A Guarantee Of Peace, And That Common Interests Would Restrain The Tendencies Of Clash, And That Businessmen Would Be Ambassadors Of Stability.

But What Happened Was The Exact Opposite In Many Moments. For The More Interdependence Increased, The More Points Of Friction Increased. And The More Trade Increased, The More Complaints Increased. And The More The Two Countries Drew Closer Economically, The More They Diverged Politically And Psychologically. And Here Lies One Of The First Surprises Of The Book: The Economy Was Not A Bridge To Peace As Much As It Was A New Arena For Internal Conflict. For The Japanese Investor In Shanghai Is Not The Japanese Farmer Who Fears That Cheap Chinese Vegetables Will Flood His Market, And Is Not The Consumer Who Fears For The Health Of His Children From Imported Food, And Is Not The Fisherman Who Sees Chinese Fishing Boats Approaching His Waters Every Morning. And All Of These Have A Voice In Japanese Democracy, And Have Their Deputies And Their Associations And Their Local Newspapers, And Have The Ability To Transform Their Daily Anxiety Into Political Pressure That Reaches The Office Of The Prime Minister.

And From Here, Smith Rejects The Two Dominant Explanations In The Literature Of International Relations About The Japanese-Chinese Relationship. The First Explanation Sees That Everything Goes Back To The Rise Of China As A Great Power Threatening American Hegemony And The Balance In Asia, And That Japan Is Merely An Ally Of The United States Moving Within A Grand Strategy. And The Second Explanation Sees That Everything Goes Back To History, To The Memory Of War And Occupation, To A Prime Minister’s Visit To The Yasukuni Shrine Or To A Line In A School Textbook, As If The Past Possesses A Magical Ability To Ignite The Present Whenever It Wishes. And Smith Does Not Deny The Importance Of Power Nor The Importance Of History, But She Says That Both Pass Through The Channel Of Domestic Politics, And That Power And History Do Not Exert Their Effect Except When They Find Someone Who Adopts Them Inside, And Someone Who Uses Them, And Someone Who Is Harmed By Them, And Someone Who Votes On Their Basis. For Rising China Does Not Reach Tokyo As An Abstract Number In A Pentagon Report, But Arrives As A Lived Reality: A Factory Closing In A Prefecture Because Its Production Moved To China, Or A Rice Field Losing To Chinese Competition, Or A Television Screen Transmitting Images Of Anti-Japanese Demonstrations In The Streets Of Beijing.

And Therefore The Structure Of The Book Itself Appears As A Methodological Declaration. For Instead Of The Book Beginning With A Chapter On Military Strategy Or On The Japanese-American Alliance, It Begins With A Chapter Entitled Contending With China, In Which It Draws A General Picture Of The Japanese Internal Scene, Then Moves To A Chapter On Diplomacy And Domestic Interests In Which It Dismantles How China Policy Was Made Inside The Ruling Party And The Ministries And The Pressure Groups, Then Devotes Full Chapters To Issues That At First Glance Seem Marginal Or Technical, But In Reality Were Theaters Of Great Political Conflict: The Old Veterans And The Families Of The Dead Who Carried The Memory Of The Empire To The Heart Of Contemporary Politics, And The Fishermen Who Drew The Maritime Borders With Their Boats Before The Diplomats Drew Them With Their Treaties, And The Consumers Who Turned The Issue Of Food Safety Into An Issue Of National Trust, And Finally The Island Defense Forces Who Found Themselves On The Front Line Of A Confrontation They Did Not Choose.

This Choice Of Topics Is In Itself A Position. For It Says To The Reader: If You Want To Understand Why The Crisis Around The Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands Escalated In 2010 And Then Exploded In 2012, Do Not Start From The Moment A Chinese Fishing Boat Collided With A Japanese Coast Guard Ship, Nor From The Moment The Noda Government Decided To Nationalize The Islands, But Start From Much Earlier, From The Change That Occurred In The Japanese Voter, And From The Decline Of The Old Grip Of The Liberal Democratic Party On Foreign Policy, And From The Rise Of A New Generation Of Politicians Who Found In Tough Talk About China A Way To Prove Their Patriotism, And From The Change In The Media, And From A General Feeling Of Anxiety About The Future. For Foreign Policy, In Smith’s Vision, Is Not A Separate Activity Practiced By Diplomats In Closed Rooms, But Is An Extension Of Domestic Politics, And A Mirror Of It, And Sometimes A Victim Of It.

And What Makes This Book Worth Reading Today, After More Than A Decade Since Its Publication, Is That It Does Not Present China And Japan To Us As An Exceptional Case, But As A Typical Case Of What Happens In The Whole World When The Global Economy Intertwines With Local Democracies. For Everywhere, The Ordinary Citizen Has Become Able To Disrupt A Major Deal, And To Bring Down A Government Because Of A Food Shipment, And To Push His Country Toward Hardening Because Of An Image On His Phone. And Smith Writes About Japan, But She Writes In Reality About Our Entire Era: An Era In Which The Borders Between Inside And Outside No Longer Exist As They Were Before, And An Era In Which Foreign Policy Is Made In The Market And In The Port And In The School Before It Is Made In The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs.

We Will Walk With Smith Chapter By Chapter, To See How Japan Built Its Policy Toward China Through Its Internal Conflicts, And How The Old Veterans Turned Into A Political Force, And How The Fishermen Drew The Borders, And How The Consumers Changed The Rules Of The Game, And How The Small Uninhabited Islands Ended Up Becoming The Title Of A Major Identity Crisis. And We Will Also See How This Book, Despite Being Written Before The Full Rise Of Xi Jinping And Before The Second Return Of Shinzo Abe And Before The American-Chinese Trade War, Still Provides A Key To Understanding What Is Happening Today In East Asia, Because The Key It Provides Is Not A Passing Political Moment, But A Deep Political Structure That Still Works Until Now.

When Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka Stepped Down From The Airplane In Beijing In September 1972, He Was Not Carrying Only A Diplomatic Bag, But He Was Also Carrying Complex Electoral Calculations, And Internal Party Conflicts, And Promises He Had Made To Himself In Electoral Districts Far From The Chinese Capital By Thousands Of Kilometers. The Normalization With China In That Autumn Was A Moment That Appears In History Books As If It Were A Rational State Decision Taken By Wise Leadership At An Appropriate Geopolitical Moment, After American President Richard Nixon Opened The Door With His Famous Visit To Beijing. But Sheila Smith Takes Us Back In The First Two Chapters Of Her Book To What Was Happening Behind The Scenes In Tokyo, To Reveal That Normalization Was Not Only A Response To World Transformations, But Was Also The Product Of A Long Internal Conflict Over Who Owns The Right To Speak On Behalf Of Japan About China, And Who Owns The Right To Reap The Profits Of The Relationship With It, And Who Will Pay Its Price.

In Post-War Japan, Foreign Policy Was Not Made In One Place. There Was The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs That Sees The World Through The Lens Of The Alliance With The United States, And The Ministry Of Trade And Industry That Sees The World Through The Lens Of Factories And Markets, And The Ministry Of Agriculture That Sees The World Through The Lens Of Rice Fields And Farmers Who Do Not Want A Competitor, And The Liberal Democratic Party That Ruled The Country For Long Decades, And Which Was In Itself A Small State Inside The State, In Which Factions And Leaderships And Interests Were Distributed As Tribes Are Distributed. And Inside This Party, There Emerged Over Time A Group Known As The China Tribe, That Is, Parliamentarians Who Specialized In The Chinese File, Built Personal Relations With Officials In Beijing, Visited China Repeatedly, And Became Indispensable Mediators Between The Two Governments, And Between Japanese Companies And The Chinese Market. These Deputies Knew That China Was Not Merely A Diplomatic File, But Was A Gateway To Electoral Resources, And To Campaign Funding, And To Investment Opportunities For Their Districts, And To Influence Inside The Party That No Ambitious Politician Could Dispense With.

Smith Explains How This Internal Structure Produced For Many Long Years What Can Be Called A Chinese Consensus Inside The Japanese Elite, A Consensus That Was Not Based On Love Nor On Trust, But On An Organized Distribution Of Gains. For The Large Companies Wanted China As A Market And A Factory, And The Politicians Wanted China As A Bridge To Influence, And The Bureaucracy Wanted China As An Arena To Expand Its Powers, And The Voters, Most Of The Time, Did Not See China Except From Afar, As News In The Evening News Bulletin. And In This Climate, It Was Possible For An Emperor Of Japanese-Chinese Relations To Conclude A Deal, And To Pass It In Parliament, And To Obtain The Support Of The Media, Without Causing A Great Noise. China Was An Elite Issue, Managed Quietly, And Its Problems Were Solved Quietly, And Its Historical Differences Were Postponed To Another Time, Under A Simple Practical Slogan: Let Us Trade Now, And Let Us Talk About History Later.

But This Calm Did Not Last. For With The End Of The Cold War, And With The Huge Economic Rise Of China, And With The Change In The Structure Of Japanese Politics Itself, The Old Consensus Began To Disintegrate From Within. And Smith Traces This Disintegration With Journalistic Care Resembling Tracing The Cracking Of An Old Wall, Crack After Crack. For In The Early Nineties, The Tiananmen Massacre Came To Put The Japanese Elite Before An Ethical Question It Was Not Accustomed To: Can We Continue Dealing With A Regime That Suppresses Its People With Such Cruelty Without The Ruling Party Paying A Moral Price Inside? And At The Same Time, The Japanese Voter Began To Change. For Traditional Party Belonging Declined, And The Voter Became More Volatile And More Influenced By The Media, And Politicians Became More Dependent On Volatile Public Opinion Instead Of Depending On Stable Electoral Machines. And China Was No Longer An Issue Managed In Closed Rooms, But Became An Issue Discussed On Television Screens, And Used In Electoral Campaigns, And Turned Into A Test Of The Politician’s Patriotism.

And At This Very Moment, Groups That Were Previously On The Margins Began To Appear On The Surface. For The Farmers, Who Feared The Flow Of Cheap Chinese Agricultural Products, Found That Their Voice Became More Audible When The Japanese Government Began Negotiating Trade Agreements. And The Small Companies That Depended On The Local Market Found Themselves Competing With Chinese Products Whose Price They Could Not Match. And The Workers Who Lost Their Jobs Because Their Factories Moved To China No Longer Saw In Beijing A Partner, But A Competitor Who Stole Their Livelihood. And All Of These, Who In The Past Accepted Elite Decisions In Silence, Now Owned New Tools Of Pressure: Civil Associations, And Media Campaigns, And Local Elections That Could Punish Any Deputy Who Ignored Them.

And Smith Adds To This Scene A Decisive Element That Is Often Absent From Analyses Of International Relations, Which Is Japanese Bureaucracy Itself. For The Ministries In Japan Are Not Merely Executive Tools Implementing What Politicians Decide, But Are Political Forces With Their Interests And Their Memory And Their Conflicts. The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Wants To Preserve Its Role As The Exclusive Owner Of Competence In The Relationship With Beijing, And The Ministry Of Economy, Trade And Industry Wants To Preserve Its Relations With The Companies Investing In China, And The Ministry Of Agriculture Wants To Protect Farmers Even If That Leads To Tension With Beijing, And The Coast Guard And The Ministry Of Defense Want To Prove Their Importance In Facing Maritime Challenges. And When These Interests Conflict, There Is Not One Voice For Japan, But Multiple Voices In Conflict, And The Prime Minister Must Choose Between Them, And Pay The Price Of His Choice.

And Here Emerges One Of The Most Beautiful Ideas Of The Book: That Japan Which We Talk About In News Bulletins Is Not A Single Homogeneous Entity, But Is A Continuous Arena Of Conflict Between Competing Interests, And That Policy Toward China Is In Many Cases The Result Of This Conflict More Than It Is The Result Of A Coherent Strategic Vision. For When Tokyo Decides To Be Firm With Beijing, That May Be Because A Ministry Wanted To Prove Its Existence, Or Because A Party Faction Wanted To Score A Point Against Its Opponent, Or Because A Major Newspaper Launched A Campaign That Made Retreat Politically Impossible. And When Tokyo Decides To Be Flexible, That May Be Because A Large Company Pressed From Behind The Scenes, Or Because A Prefecture Depending On Chinese Tourism Threatened That It Would Punish The Government In The Elections.

Smith Traces The Transformation Of The China Tribe Itself. For After This Tribe Was The Bridge Linking Tokyo To Beijing, It Became Over Time A Political Burden. For In A New World In Which Talking About China In Friendly Language Was Seen As Weakness, And In Which Politicians Competed Over Who Appeared More Firm, The Members Of The Tribe Found Themselves Accused Of Being Agents Of Beijing, Or Of Having Sold Japan’s Interests For Their Personal Interests. And Their Influence Declined, And With It Declined The Unofficial Channels That Were Used To Solve Crises Quietly Before They Escalated. And Crises, Instead Of Being Solved In Closed Rooms Between Old Friends Who Knew Each Other, Were Solved On Television Screens, Before An Angry Public That Does Not Accept Compromise Solutions.

Smith Pauses Long At The Moment Of The Nineties And The Beginning Of The New Millennium, When The Japanese Government Began To Realize That China Was No Longer A Poor Country Needing Japanese Aid, But Had Become A Real Economic And Political Competitor. For Japan Had Been Providing China With Huge Development Aid Since 1979, And This Aid Was Provided In The Beginning As Part Of An Undeclared Historical Settlement, And As A Tool For Building Trust, And As A Means To Open The Chinese Market To Japanese Companies. But With The Passage Of Time, Japanese Public Opinion Began To Ask: Why Do We Provide Money To A Country That Has Become Able To Launch Satellites And Build Aircraft Carriers? And Why Do We Continue Financing A Country That Uses Our Money To Strengthen Its Army? And Aid, Which Was One Day A Symbol Of Friendship, Turned Into A Subject Of Internal Debate, And Into A Card Used By Politicians To Prove That They Defend Taxpayers’ Money. And In 2008, Aid Almost Stopped, Not Because China Asked For That, But Because Japan Was No Longer Politically Able To Continue It.

This Transformation In Aid Is A Miniature Example Of What Happens In The Whole Book: For Every File Begins Economically Or Diplomatically, But Ends Politically Internally. And Smith Does Not Write About These Transformations From A Dry Academic Perspective, But Conveys To Us The Voices Of The People Who Lived Them. We Hear The Voice Of An Employee In The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Complaining That He Is No Longer Able To Contact His Chinese Counterpart Without Being Accused Of Treason, And The Voice Of A Businessman Explaining How He Became Afraid To Mention In A Public Meeting That He Invests In China, And The Voice Of A Young Politician Saying Frankly That He Learned That Tough Talk About China Brings Votes More Than Balanced Talk. These Small Voices Are What Ultimately Make The Big Picture, And They Are What Make Smith’s Book A Journalistic Work Par Excellence Despite Being Issued By An Academic Researcher.

And At The End Of This Part, Smith Leaves Us A Question: If Japanese Policy Toward China Has Become A Hostage To Domestic Politics In This Way, How Can Any Japanese Government Manage A Real Crisis With Beijing? And How Can It Present A Necessary Concession Without Being Accused Of Treason? And How Can It Be Firm Without Slipping Into A Confrontation That No One Wants? These Questions Will Find Their Answers, Or At Least Attempts To Answer Them, In The Following Chapters, When We Move From Parliament Halls To Memory Squares, And From Ministry Offices To Fishermen’s Boats, And From Meeting Rooms To Consumers’ Kitchens.

If You Asked Any Western Diplomat About The Reason For Tension In Relations Between Japan And China, He Would Answer You In Most Cases With One Word: History. And If You Asked Any Journalist In Tokyo About The Most Sensitive File In This Relationship, He Would Point Without Hesitation To The Yasukuni Shrine In The Heart Of The Capital, That Place Where A Visit That Does Not Take More Than A Few Minutes Turns Into A Diplomatic Crisis Shaking All Of Asia. But Sheila Smith, In The Chapter She Devotes To Old Veterans And War Memory, Rejects This Easy Answer, Or At Least Refuses To Be Satisfied With It. For She Does Not Deny That History Is Present, But She Says That History Does Not Attend By Itself, But Is Summoned, And Used, And Reinterpreted, And Turned Into Political Capital Inside Japan, And That Those Who Summon It Are In Most Cases Not Historians Nor Diplomats, But Bereaved Families, And Associations Of Old Veterans, And Politicians Looking For An Electoral Base, And Ordinary Citizens Who Still Carry In Their Homes A Picture Of A Father Or An Uncle Who Died In The War And Did Not Return.

This Chapter Begins From An Unexpected Place: Not From A Lecture Hall At The University Of Tokyo, Nor From The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, But From Small Houses In The Japanese Countryside, Where The Widows Of Soldiers Still Keep Yellow Official Papers, And Wooden Boxes Containing Remains Of Ash, And Memories That The State Does Not Want To Forget And Cannot Remember In A Way That Satisfies Everyone. For Japan After The War Did Not Deal With Its Imperial Past As Germany Dealt With Its Nazi Past. There Were No Wide Trials, And There Was No Decisive Symbolic Break, And There Was No National Consensus On How To Remember The War. And Instead Of That, Memory Was Left To A Long Conflict Between Multiple Forces: A Left That Wants Full Recognition Of Responsibility, And A Right That Wants To Restore National Dignity, And A Center That Wants To Forget And Look To The Future, And Families That Want Only That The Sacrifice Of Their Sons Be Recognized Without Being Accused Of Being Criminals.

At The Heart Of This Conflict Stands The Yasukuni Shrine. For This Shrine, Which Was Built In The Nineteenth Century To Honor The Spirits Of Those Who Died For The Emperor, Turned After The War Into A Symbol Of All The Tensions That Were Not Resolved. For In It Are Honored The Spirits Of More Than Two And A Half Million Soldiers, Among Them Fourteen Of The Senior War Leaders Who Were Convicted As First-Class War Criminals After 1945. And When A Japanese Prime Minister Visits This Shrine In His Official Capacity, The Visit Is Not Read In Beijing And Seoul As Merely A Religious Ritual Or An Expression Of Respect For The Dead, But Is Read As A Political Signal That Japan Has Not Yet Abandoned Its Past, And That It Does Not Recognize Its Crimes. And When The Prime Minister Refrains From Visiting, His Refraining Is Not Read Inside As Diplomatic Wisdom, But Is Read By The Right As Betrayal Of The Memory Of The Martyrs, And By The Families Of The Dead As Disregard For Their Pains.

Smith Explains How This Shrine Was Not In The Beginning An External Issue, But Was An Internal Issue Par Excellence, Related To The Relationship Of The State To Religion, And To The Separation Of Religion From Politics Imposed By The Post-War Constitution, And To A Conflict Between Shinto Associations And Associations Of Old Veterans On One Side, And Between Opposition Parties And Unions On The Other Side. For In The Seventies And Eighties, The Debate About Yasukuni Revolved In Japanese Courts, And In Parliament, And In Local Newspapers, And The Central Question Was: Does The State Have The Right To Fund A Religious Shrine? And Does The Prime Minister Have The Right To Visit It In His Official Capacity? And China Was Not Present In This Debate Except On The Margin. But With The Rise Of China And With The Change In Japanese Domestic Politics, The Shrine Turned From An Internal Constitutional Issue Into An International Diplomatic Issue, And Every Decision About It Became Calculated By The Scale Of Relations With Beijing.

And Smith Continues, How Different Politicians Used The Shrine For Completely Different Purposes. For In The Eighties, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Visited The Shrine On The Anniversary Of The End Of The War, And He Believed He Was Performing A National Duty, But He Retreated In The Following Year When He Realized The Size Of The Diplomatic Damage. And At The Beginning Of The Millennium, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Visited The Shrine Six Times, And He Did Not Do That Only Because He Believed In Its Symbolic Importance, But Because He Knew That These Visits Granted Him Popularity Inside, And Made Him Appear As A Strong Leader Who Does Not Submit To Foreign Pressures, Even If The Price Of That Was A Complete Freezing Of Relations With China For Years. And Koizumi, As Smith Describes Him, Was A Populist Politician Par Excellence, Who Understood That Foreign Policy Could Be Used As An Electoral Tool, And That The Image Transmitted By Television Lenses Of Him Walking Firmly Toward The Shrine Was Stronger Than Any Diplomatic Statement.

But Smith Does Not Content Herself With Narrating The Visits Of Prime Ministers, But Goes Down To A Deeper Level, To The Association Of The Families Of The Dead, Which Is One Of The Strongest Pressure Groups In Post-War Japan, And Which Played A Decisive Role In Shaping Official Memory. For This Association, Which Includes Widows And Sons And Grandsons Of Soldiers Who Died In The War, Was Not Demanding Revenge Nor War, But Was Demanding Something Simpler And More Human: That The State Recognize The Sacrifice Of Its Sons, And Provide Them With Material And Moral Support, And That Their Memory Not Be Left To Oblivion. And With The Passage Of Time, These Human Demands Turned Into Political Demands, And The Association Became An Electoral Force That No Politician Could Ignore, And Became Able To Determine The Fate Of Deputies In Narrow Electoral Districts. And When The Association Supported Visiting Yasukuni, Politicians Found Themselves Forced To Visit Even If They Knew That The Visit Would Anger Beijing.

And In Contrast, Other Voices Appear In The Chapter That Are No Less Important, The Voices Of Teachers Who Refused To Be Forced To Teach One Version Of History, And The Voices Of Historians Who Tried To Write School Books That Recognize What Happened In Nanjing And In Manchuria, And The Voices Of Activists Who Stood Beside The Comfort Women Who Were Forced To Work In Japanese Military Brothels, And Demanded Apology And Compensation. And These Voices, As Smith Shows, Were Not Marginal Voices, But Were In Some Periods The Dominant Voice In Japanese Society, Especially In The Seventies And Eighties, When Japan Was Living A State Of Self-Criticism And Openness. But With The Change In The Political Climate In The Nineties, And With The Rise Of A New National Discourse That Sees That Japan Was Wronged In Historical Narratives, These Voices Receded, And Became Accused Of Hating Japan, Or Of Serving Foreign Agendas.

And Here Lies The Paradox That Smith Puts Before Us With All Clarity: That Historical Memory In Japan Was Never One Memory, But Was Always An Arena Of Conflict, And That China Was Not The One Imposing On Japan How To Remember, But The Japanese Themselves Were Arguing About How To Remember, And China Used This Internal Debate Sometimes, And Was Affected By It At Other Times, But It Was Not The One Who Made It. For When Japan Was Divided About Its History, Beijing Found In This Division An Opportunity To Pressure, And When Japan Was Relatively United In A Self-Critical Position, Beijing Found It Difficult To Use History As A Weapon. And Therefore, Understanding The Yasukuni Crisis Does Not Require Only Understanding What China Wants, But Requires Understanding What The Japanese Voter Wants, And What The Association Of The Families Of The Dead Fears, And What A Young Politician Looking For Distinction Needs.

And Smith Goes Further When She Explains How A New Generation Of Japanese, Who Did Not Live The War And Did Not Know China Except Through Television Screens And The Internet, Began To Deal With History In A Completely Different Way From The Generation Of Their Fathers. For This Generation Does Not Feel Guilt Toward The War, And Does Not Understand Why It Must Apologize For Something It Did Not Do, And Sees That China’s Repeated Demands For Apology Are An Attempt To Humiliate Japan, Not An Attempt At Reconciliation. And At The Same Time, This Generation Became More Affected By Images Coming From China: Demonstrations Burning Japanese Flags, And Chinese School Books Describing The Japanese With Harsh Descriptions, And Chinese Political Speeches Using Japan As An External Enemy To Unify The Inside. And Thus, History For This Generation Became Not Memory, But A Present Conflict, And Defending Yasukuni Became Defending National Dignity In The Face Of A Neighbor That Seems To It Aggressive.

Smith Succeeds In Making Us Feel The Weight Of History Without Falling Into The Trap Of Simplification. For She Does Not Say That Japan Did Not Apologize, And Does Not Say That China Exaggerates In Its Demands, But Says That There Are In Japan Those Who Want To Apologize Sincerely, And There Are Those Who Refuse To Apologize, And There Are Those Who Want To Forget, And There Are Those Who Cannot Forget, And That This Internal Conflict Is What Makes Any Official Apology Appear Incomplete In The Eyes Of Beijing, And Makes Any Retreat From Apology Appear As Treason In The Eyes Of Tokyo. For History Here Is Not A Past That Ended, But Is A Present Living In People’s Houses, And In Memory Boxes, And In Ballot Boxes.

And When We Close This Chapter, We Realize That Smith Has Prepared Us For What Is More Dangerous: For If History Was Able To Ignite A Crisis Because Of Visiting A Shrine, What Will It Do When The Conflict Moves From Symbols To Waters, And From Memory To Direct Economic Interests? This Is What We Will Find, When We Sail With Japanese Fishermen To The East China Sea, And Discover How A Small Fishing Boat Was Able To Move Fleets, And To Change Governments, And To Draw Borders That Diplomats Could Not Draw.

On A Cold Morning Of The Autumn Mornings Of 2010, A Small Chinese Fishing Boat Was Sailing Near Uninhabited Islands In The East China Sea, Whose Number Of Inhabitants Does Not Exceed Zero, And Whose Size Does Not Exceed A Few Rocks Emerging From The Water. The Captain Of That Boat Was Not Thinking About Geopolitics, Nor About Balances Of Power, Nor About The Japanese-American Alliance. He Was Thinking About Something Much Simpler: About Today’s Catch, And About The Price Of Fish In The Market, And About His Debts That Had Accumulated On Him. But Within A Few Hours, That Boat Turned Into A Main Headline In All News Bulletins In Asia, And Its Captain Turned Into A National Hero In Beijing And Into A Criminal In Tokyo, And The Small Rocks Near Which He Was Fishing Turned Into A Cause Of A Diplomatic Crisis That Almost Cut Relations Between The Largest Two Economies In Asia. This Incident, Which Appears On Its Surface As A Passing Maritime Incident, Is The One With Which Sheila Smith Opens Her Chapter On The Shared Maritime Boundary, To Tell Us That Borders In East Asia Were Not Drawn In Negotiation Halls, But Were Drawn First In Fishermen’s Nets, And In The Maps Of Oil Companies, And In The Fears Of The Inhabitants Of Remote Islands Who Felt That They Were Left Alone In The Face Of A Giant Neighbor.

For The East China Sea, As Smith Describes It, Is Not Merely A Blue Space On The Map, But Is A Living Space. For In It Live Japanese Fishermen Who Inherited The Profession From Their Fathers And Grandfathers, And In It Swim Schools Of Fish On Which Thousands Of Families Depend, And Under It Lie Potential Reserves Of Oil And Gas That Made Every Rock Of Economic And Strategic Value. And In It Also, And This Is The Most Important, Meet Three Completely Different Narratives About Sovereignty: A Japanese Narrative Saying That The Islands Are Japanese Since The Nineteenth Century And That They Are Not Subject To Any Dispute, And A Chinese Narrative Saying That The Islands Are Chinese Since Centuries And That Japan Stole Them In A Moment Of Chinese Weakness, And A Taiwanese Narrative Saying That The Islands Belong To It As Well. And These Narratives Were Not Merely Academic Disputes About Old Documents, But Were Disputes Living In People’s Daily Lives, In Fishing Permits, And In Coast Guard Patrols, And In The Decisions Of Oil Companies That Want To Know Where They Can Drill Without Causing A Crisis.

Smith Traces How The Japanese Government Tried For Many Long Years To Follow A Policy Of No Dispute, That Is, To Ignore The Existence Of A Dispute At All, And To Manage The Islands Quietly, And To Prevent Any Person, Japanese Or Chinese, From Approaching Them In A Way That Causes Tension. And This Policy Depended On An Implicit Understanding With Beijing: You Do Not Raise The Problem, And We Do Not Raise It, And Let Us Leave It To Coming Generations. But This Fragile Understanding Began To Erode From Within, Not Because Of A Strategic Decision In Beijing, But Because Of Small Changes In Japan Itself. For The Fishermen Changed, And Technology Changed, And The Media Changed, And Local Politics In Okinawa Changed, That Southern Prefecture That Always Feels That It Is Far From Tokyo, And That Tokyo Uses It As A Front Shield Without Listening To It.

In Okinawa, As Smith Explains, People Do Not Look At China As The Inhabitants Of Tokyo Look At It. For For The Inhabitants Of Okinawa, China Is Not Merely A Competitor, But Is A Historical Neighbor, And An Old Commercial Partner, And A Source Of Tourists Who Fill Their Hotels And Their Restaurants. And At The Same Time, China Is A Source Of Direct Security Concern, Because The Inhabitants Of These Islands Are The First Who Will Face Any Escalation, And They Are The First Who Will Pay The Price Of Any Confrontation. And This Duality Made Local Politics In Okinawa A Decisive Factor In National Politics. For When A Fisherman From Okinawa Complains That A Chinese Boat Entered His Waters, His Complaint Does Not Remain A Local Complaint, But Quickly Turns Into A Question In Parliament, And Into A Television Report, And Into Pressure On The Prime Minister To Do Something.

And Smith Narrates How The Japanese Coast Guard, Which Was A Device That Was Seen In The Past As A Civil Technical Device Whose Mission Was To Rescue The Drowning And Prevent Smuggling, Gradually Turned Into A Security Device On The Front Line, And Its Ships And The Decisions Of Its Captains Began To Determine The Course Of Relations Between The Two Countries. For When The Commander Of A Coast Guard Ship Decides To Stop A Chinese Fishing Boat, Or To Launch Water Hoses At It, Or To Arrest Its Captain, He Does Not Take Only A Technical Decision, But Takes A Political Decision That Will Have Repercussions In Beijing And In Tokyo And In Washington. And In The Incident Of 2010, When The Chinese Fishing Boat Minjinyu Collided With Two Japanese Coast Guard Ships, And The Japanese Authorities Arrested Its Captain, Tokyo Was Not Ready For What Would Happen After That. For Beijing Responded By Stopping The Export Of Rare Minerals That Japanese Industry Desperately Needs, And By Arresting Japanese Citizens In China, And By Launching A Fierce Media Campaign, And By Canceling Official Meetings. And The Japanese Government Found Itself Before Two Choices Both Bitter: Either To Retreat And Release The Captain, And Appear Weak Inside, Or To Continue Detaining Him, And Risk An Economic Break With Its Largest Trade Partner.

And In This Chapter, Smith Reveals That The Decision Taken By The Government Of The Japanese Democratic Party At That Time To Release The Captain Was Not A Studied Diplomatic Decision, But Was The Result Of An Internal Conflict Between Competing Ministries, And Between Politicians Fearing For Their Electoral Future, And Between Pressures From Companies That Feared Losing The Chinese Market. And She Explains How This Decision, Which Appeared To Many In Japan As Surrender To Chinese Pressures, Led To A Decline Of Trust In The Government, And To The Rise Of A Right-Wing Discourse Saying That Japan Needs To Be More Firm, And To Paving The Way For A Bigger Crisis Two Years Later, When The Japanese Government Decided To Nationalize The Islands, That Is, To Buy Them From Their Private Japanese Owner, In An Attempt To Prevent The Nationalist Governor Of Tokyo Shintaro Ishihara From Buying Them Himself And Turning Them Into A Provocation Arena. And The Tragic Paradox Was That The Decision Taken To Prevent Escalation Was The One That Ignited The Biggest Escalation, Because Beijing Read Nationalization As A Change Of The Status Quo, And Responded With Huge Demonstrations In Which Japanese Factories And Shops In China Were Burned, And By Sending Patrol Ships To The Waters Of The Islands Regularly, To Impose A New Reality With Which The Policy Of No Dispute Was No Longer Possible.

And From The Sea, Smith Takes Us To Another Place No Less Important And No Less Dangerous: To The Japanese Kitchen, To The Dining Table, To Where The Issue Of Food Safety Turns Into An Issue Of National Security. For In Her Fifth Chapter, Which May Seem At First Glance Far From Foreign Policy, The Author Reveals One Of The Most Exciting Chapters In The Book, Which Is The Chapter Of The Poisoned Gyoza. For In 2008, A Number Of Japanese Were Poisoned After Eating Frozen Gyoza Imported From China, And It Turned Out That This Gyoza Was Contaminated With An Insecticide. And The Incident Was Not Large In Terms Of The Number Of Victims, But The Reaction To It Was Huge. For Japanese Newspapers Were Filled With Reports About Unsafe Chinese Food, And Japanese Consumers Began To Avoid Any Product Written On It Made In China, And Civil Associations Began To Demand Tightening Control, And Politicians Began To Demand That The Government Protect The Health Of Citizens Even If That Led To Tension With Beijing.

Smith Explains That This Reaction Was Not Merely A Health Fear, But Was An Expression Of A Deeper Crisis Of Trust. For The Japanese Consumer, Who Was Accustomed For Decades To Trust That What He Eats Is Safe, And That The Government Monitors Everything With Precision, Suddenly Found Himself Before A New World, A World Of Globalization, Where His Food Comes From Distant Places He Does Not Know, And From Factories He Does Not See, And From Control Systems He Does Not Trust. And Chinese Food Was The Clearest Symbol Of This New World, Because It Was Cheap And Available, But It Was Also Mysterious. And When A Number Of People Were Poisoned, The Question That The Japanese Asked Was Not What Happened In One Factory In China?, But The Question Was Can We Trust Globalization? And Can We Trust Our Government That Allowed That? And Can We Trust China?

And Smith Traces How Consumer Associations, Which In The Past Were Small Associations Concerned With Vegetable Prices, Turned Into An Influential Political Force, Able To Organize Boycott Campaigns, And To Pressure Large Stores To Change Their Sources, And To Push Parliament To Enact New Laws For Food Safety. And She Explains How Japanese Farmers, Who Feared Chinese Competition, Found In The Food Crisis A Golden Opportunity To Reintroduce Themselves As Protectors Of National Health, And That The Japanese Product, Although It Is More Expensive, Is The Safe Product That Deserves Support. And Thus, The Gyoza Issue Turned From A Health Issue Into A Commercial And Political Issue, And Became Used In Trade Negotiations, And In Electoral Campaigns, And In Shaping The Image Of China In Japanese Consciousness.

And In This Chapter Also, Smith Reveals Another Aspect Of The Intimacy Between The Two Countries: That Japan And China Are No Longer Two Separate Countries Exchanging Goods, But Have Become Part Of One Production Chain, Where Food Is Grown In China, And Processed In Japan, And Sold In Japan, And Consumed In Japan, So That Any Defect In One Link Shakes The Whole Chain. And This Intertwining Is What Made It Impossible For Japan To Boycott China Even If It Wanted, And Made It Impossible For China To Ignore The Japanese Market Even If It Wanted. For The Rivalry Here Is Not The Rivalry Of Two Countries That Can Turn Their Backs On Each Other, But Is The Rivalry Of Two Partners Forced To Live Together In One House, Quarreling Over The Cleanliness Of The Kitchen, But They Cannot Leave The House.

And When We Reach The End Of This Chapter, We Realize That Smith Has Drawn For Us A Complete Picture Of Japan As It Faces China In Every Detail Of Its Daily Life: In The Sea Where Its Sons Fish, And In The Kitchen Where Its Families Eat, And In The Market Where It Buys, And In The School Where Its Children Learn History. And In All These Places, The Japanese Internal Conflict Was What Determined How Tokyo Would Deal With Beijing, And Not The Opposite. And There Remained Before Us One Chapter, Which Is The Most Exciting And The Most Decisive: The Chapter Of Island Defense, Where All These Threads Will Gather Together, And The Internal Conflict Will Turn Into A Security Crisis Threatening Peace In All Of Asia.

When We Approach The End Of The Book, We Find Ourselves On Board A Japanese Coast Guard Ship Sailing In Cold Waters Around Small Islands Inhabited By No One, But Which Suddenly Became The Center Of The World. For In The Last Chapter, Which Bears The Title Island Defense, Sheila Smith Gathers All The Threads She Wove In The Previous Chapters, And Puts Them Before Us At Once: The Threads Of Memory, And The Threads Of Fishermen, And The Threads Of Consumers, And The Threads Of Politicians, And The Threads Of Bureaucrats, To Tell Us That The Island Crisis Was Not A Crisis Of Islands, But Was A Crisis Of All Of Japan, A Crisis Of Identity And Role And Future. For The Senkaku Islands, As The Japanese Call Them, Or Diaoyu As The Chinese Call Them, Are Not Islands In The Familiar Geographical Sense. They Are Five Small Islands And Three Rocks, In Which There Is No Fresh Water Nor Land Suitable For Agriculture, And No One Lives In Them Permanently. But They Became, By The Effect Of Domestic Politics In The Two Countries, A Symbol Of Sovereignty, And A Symbol Of Dignity, And A Symbol Of The Ability To Protect The Homeland, So That Any Retreat From Them Is Read As A Retreat From The Whole Homeland.

Smith Narrates How Japan, Which For Decades Followed A Policy Of Quiet Ignoring, Suddenly Found Itself Facing A New Reality Imposed By China. For After The Crisis Of 2010, Beijing Began Sending Its Ships Regularly To The Waters Surrounding The Islands, To Say Practically That These Waters Are Not Purely Japanese, And That There Is A Dispute That Must Be Recognized. And Tokyo Responded By Strengthening The Presence Of The Coast Guard, And Building New Facilities, And Trying To Convince The Inhabitants Of Okinawa That The Government Will Not Abandon Them. But The Real Problem, As Smith Reveals, Was Not In The Sea, But Was In Tokyo Itself, Where Politicians Were Competing Over Who Appeared More Hardline, And The Media Transmitted Every Chinese Move As An Imminent Invasion, And Public Opinion, Which Became More Anxious About The Future And More Doubtful Of Its Government’s Ability To Protect It, Demanded A Firm Position That Does Not Accept Compromise.

And At The Heart Of This Crisis, Appears The Name Of Shintaro Ishihara, The Nationalist Governor Of Tokyo, Who Announced In April 2012 That He Wanted To Buy The Islands From Their Private Owner, And Collected Donations From Citizens To Finance The Purchase, And Turned The Issue Into A Popular Campaign. And Ishihara Did Not Do That Only Because He Believed That The Islands Are Japanese, But Because He Knew That This Issue Granted Him National Fame, And Made Him A National Hero, And Put The Central Government In A Dilemma With No Exit. For If The Government Left Him To Buy The Islands, It Would Allow A Local Politician To Determine The Foreign Policy Of The Country, And If It Prevented Him And Bought The Islands Itself, That Is, Nationalized Them, It Would Anger Beijing Which Would See In That A Change Of The Status Quo. And The Government Of The Democratic Party, Headed By Yoshihiko Noda, Chose The Second Option, Believing That By That It Prevents Escalation, But It Discovered That It Ignited The Biggest Crisis Since The Normalization Of Relations.

Smith Describes The Days That Followed Nationalization In September 2012, Where The Reader Hears The Voices Of Demonstrators In The Streets Of Beijing And Shanghai Burning Japanese Cars And Smashing Shop Fronts, And Sees The Images Of Japanese Factories That Stopped Working, And Hears The Voices Of Japanese Businessmen In China Calling Tokyo Asking For Help. And She Explains How This Crisis Was Not The Result Of A Chinese Conspiracy Nor The Result Of A Single Japanese Mistake, But Was The Result Of A Long Accumulation Of Internal Decisions In The Two Countries, Which Made Any Compromise Solution Impossible. For In China, Leaders Were Preparing To Hand Over Power To A New Generation, And None Of Them Wanted To Appear Weak Before Japan. And In Japan, The Government Was Weak, And Elections Were At The Door, And No Politician Wanted To Appear As If He Was Conceding Japanese Land. And At This Moment, The Small Islands Became Bigger Than The Two Countries, And They Became The Ones Leading The Politicians, And Not The Opposite.

And Here Smith Reaches One Of Her Conclusions: That Defending The Islands Was No Longer Only A Military Issue, But Became An Internal Political Issue Related To How Japan Defines Itself In The Twenty-First Century. Is Japan A Peaceful Country Depending On The Peaceful Constitution And On The Alliance With The United States? Or Is It A Normal Country That Must Be Able To Defend Itself By Itself? And Can Japan Protect Its Islands Without Changing Its Constitution? And Can It Change Its Constitution Without Arousing The Fears Of Its Neighbors? These Questions, Which In The Past Were Elite Questions Discussed In Tokyo Universities, Became After The Island Crisis Popular Questions Discussed In Cafes And In Television Programs, And Became Part Of The Rise Of Shinzo Abe, Who Returned To The Prime Ministership In December 2012 With A Clear Discourse Saying That Japan Must Be Strong, And Not Submit To Chinese Pressures, And Restore Its Glory.

And Smith Follows How Abe, Who In His First Term In 2006 Had Tried To Repair Relations With China, Returned In His Second Term With A More Firm Discourse, But At The Same Time He Was Aware That Japan Cannot Live Without China Economically, And That He Must Find A Way To Coexist With It. And This Duality, Which Characterized Abe’s Policy, Is The Duality That Characterizes All Of Japan: A Desire For Firmness And A Desire For Coexistence, Fear Of China And Need For It, Rising Nationalism And Rising Economic Dependence. And Smith Does Not Provide Us With A Magical Solution To This Duality, But Says That This Duality Is The Permanent Truth Of The Relationship, And That Any Japanese Government Must Learn How To Manage It, Not Try To Solve It Once And For All.

And In The Conclusion, Smith Poses A Question That Carries All The Weight Of The Book: Can Japan And China Be Intimate Rivals Without Turning Into Enemies? And She Answers That The Answer Does Not Lie In Beijing Nor In Washington, But In Tokyo Itself, In The Ability Of Japanese Democracy To Produce Leadership Able To Tell The Truth To Its Citizens: That China Is Not Going Anywhere, And That Japan Is Not Able To Isolate Itself From It, And That Firmness Is Necessary But Not Sufficient, And That Concession Is Not Treason, But Is Sometimes The Highest Degree Of Responsibility. And She Says That Japan Must Build New Channels For Dialogue With China, Channels That Do Not Depend On The Old China Tribe That Collapsed, But On New Institutions, And On Dialogue Between Civil Societies, And On Understandings Between Fishermen, And Between Businessmen, And Between Youth, So That The Relationship Does Not Remain Hostage To Visiting A Shrine Or To The Incident Of A Fishing Boat.

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