From original sin to primordial nature

The book “Christian Ethics: A Historical and Systematic Analysis of Its Dominant Ideas” by the thinker Isma’il Raji al-Faruqi stands as a milestone in the history of intellectual and religious dialogue between the Islamic and Christian traditions. This monumental work is not merely a passing study or a superficial reading, but rather a profound academic and philosophical dive into the historical and theological roots of Christian ethics, written by a seasoned Arab Muslim scholar who lived and interacted with Western and Christian thought from within, probing the depths of its texts and its developments through the ages. Al-Faruqi was born in the city of Jaffa, Palestine, and received his early education within the fold of Arabic and Islamic culture before embarking on a long academic journey in Western universities, which granted him an exceptional ability to absorb both Islamic and Western heritage with a sharp critical consciousness. This dual capability bore fruit in this reference book, which was published during his research fellowship at the prestigious Faculty of Divinity at McGill University, in a unique experience that brought a Muslim researcher together with Christian colleagues in continuous daily theological and ethical dialogue, lending the book a character of depth and frank disclosure.

Al-Faruqi begins his methodological approach from a fundamental principle that he sees as an urgent historical necessity for our contemporary world, namely the principle of the unity of humanity, which must transcend sectarian, national, and denominational isolation. He directs his discourse firmly and deeply to the global cultural and religious community, emphasizing that the time has come to transcend the era of living in isolated intellectual islands, and that the common destiny of humanity requires mutual understanding and bold self-criticism that transcends the walls of the tribe and the sect. In this broad context, the book presents itself not as a traditional polemical or offensive work aimed at undermining Christianity, but as a sincere call for communication and for the joint intellectual reconstruction among the followers of the major religions. Al-Faruqi holds deep respect and sincere veneration for the religion of Jesus Christ, viewing it from a pure Islamic perspective that the God who sent Jesus and revealed His word to him is the same Living God who sent Abraham, Moses, and Muhammad. Consequently, his rigorous criticism is by no means directed at the essence of the transparent message of Jesus, but is focused entirely on the theological developments and accumulations that followed it later, which he terms “Christianism.”

To achieve this deep and as-neutral-as-possible cognitive understanding, al-Faruqi adopts a precise philosophical method based on the concept of “Epoche,” or the systematic suspension of prejudices and the temporary shedding of personal beliefs. The researcher believes that the study of religious phenomena cannot be carried out with a cold scientific mentality that deals with religious experience as dry material elements or purely laboratory data; rather, the fair researcher must spiritually and mentally divest themselves, diving into the religious experience of the other, attempting to live and understand it from within, receiving its meanings and radiations exactly as those who believe in it experience them. This temporary phenomenological detachment allows the researcher to receive spiritual and ethical meanings honestly before returning armed with their rational critical tools to evaluate them and place them in the balance of universal reason. However, phenomenological detachment alone, in al-Faruqi’s view, is not sufficient to build a true comparative study with evaluative value; there must be governing and objective reference principles, or what he calls a framework of “meta-religion” or meta-religious principles. These meta-religious principles are based essentially on absolute rationality, internal logical consistency, and the correspondence of principles with the cumulative reality of human knowledge. They are considered the decisive criterion through which religions, cultures, and ethical systems can be evaluated without falling into the trap of destructive moral relativity that equates truth with illusion. Through this tight philosophical framework, al-Faruqi emphasizes with firm conviction that rationality is the only universal tool capable and qualified to judge religious systems, and that the absence of internal consistency or excessive reliance on contradictory paradoxes constitutes a deep structural flaw in any theological system that seeks to guide human behavior.

In light of these strict methodological principles, al-Faruqi wields the scalpel of historical criticism to deconstruct the dominant Christian ethical structure, distinguishing clearly and decisively between the pure “Ethics of Jesus,” which represents the pinnacle of spiritual transcendence, and the subsequent theological and dogmatic development led by the giants of Christian theology, beginning with Paul, passing through Augustine, reaching the pioneers of religious reform like Luther and Calvin, and ending with modern-day theologians such as Karl Barth and Reinhold Niebuhr. Al-Faruqi sees, through a flowing historical analysis, that the original message of Jesus was a radical and comprehensive ethical revolution, ignited in response to the rigid ethnocentrism and cold formalist legislation that shackled Jewish thought and sentiment in his era. The pure ethics of Jesus focused on the human interior, on the purity of intention and the radical and complete transformation of the self, making the good will, directed entirely toward the love of God, the sole criterion of moral value, thereby transcending every formal or external legal constraint.

Al-Faruqi elaborates in analytical narratives that flow smoothly to illustrate the complex Jewish background from which the ethical revolution of Jesus was launched, showing with historical evidence how Hebrew thought was organically and inextricably linked throughout its journey with a racist ethnic tendency, making the idea of the survival of the Jewish group a supreme goal higher than any other universal ethical consideration. In this crisis-ridden context, especially after the return from the Babylonian exile, the Jewish legislative law, as formulated by Ezra and Nehemiah, became a strict tool for maintaining this ethnic isolationism and protecting it from dissolving into the vast sea of humanity, where ethics shrank to become mere literal compliance with harsh external rituals and prohibitions, devoid of any spiritual pulse or internal ethical motive. Amidst this formal rigidity and spiritual vacuum that dominated the Pharisees and Sadducees, the resounding cry of Jesus came to restore things to their true divine course and to declare clearly that the value and morality of the individual human being far exceed the value of the ethnic group or political affiliation, and that a true and sincere relationship with God is never built on belonging to a particular blood or a closed sect, but depends exclusively on a pure internal transformation and a conscious free will that seeks entirely to achieve the good divine will.

This sharp and deep vision of the ethics of Jesus, as al-Faruqi interprets it, leads him naturally to conduct an original and interesting comparison between the essence of Jesus’s ethical message and Islamic Sufism in its purest manifestations. Al-Faruqi demonstrates with a cohesive argument that Sufism, with its deep and continuous focus on purifying the interior and singling out God alone with pure love and sincere orientation, represents in its essence a logical extension and a counterpart application in the Islamic environment of the ethical revolution inaugurated by Jesus in the Jewish environment. Both spiritual lines sincerely and desperately seek to reach a state of consciousness and transcendence in which God, Glory be to Him, is the sole actor and the only director of the human will, thereby transcending the danger of legal formalism that may lead in moments of historical stagnation to emptying religion of its flowing spiritual content and turning it into mere rituals emptied of their sublime ethical purpose. With this methodological and historical foundation, al-Faruqi paves the solid ground for moving to the most controversial and complex axis in his study, the axis that will address how these pure Jesus-like ethics underwent a radical value transformation and a systematic emptying at the hands of subsequent Christian theology, and how the teachings of pure love and self-ethical transformation were replaced by a complex theological system centered around the concepts of original sin, the fallen nature of man, and the inevitability of external redemptive salvation—concepts that al-Faruqi believes changed the ethical face of Christianity forever and shaped what we know today as Western Christian thought.

Al-Faruqi takes us in his diagnostic reading to the second part of his book, which represents the core of his critical thesis, what he termed “The Christianist Transvaluation.” In this controversial and contemplative section, the writer dives into the depths of Christian theology and its historical development, posing a fundamental philosophical and religious question: “What is man?” and how did the idea of the “Image of God in man” (Imago Dei) develop through the ecclesiastical ages? Al-Faruqi clarifies with fairness and justice that Hellenic Christianity and the early Apostolic Fathers adopted a bright humanistic view consistent with reason and the primordial nature (Fitra), as they saw that man was created in the image and likeness of God, and that this image is inherent in him as a good rational nature. In that early era, man was viewed as the “crown of creation” and the masterpiece of the Creator, possessing reason and freedom of will that qualified him to know the truth and achieve the good. The idea of the miserable inevitable “Fall” had not yet dominated theology; rather, ethics centered on spiritual transcendence and drawing closer to God through good deeds and the monitoring of conscience.

However, this humanistic brightness did not last long in the history of Western thought. Al-Faruqi points out that the dangerous turn began with St. Augustine, who brilliantly laid the linguistic and philosophical foundations for a radical shift in the view of the human being. For Augustine, the “Image of God” was no longer just a natural gift or an independent innate rational mental capacity, but became conditioned by man’s absolute submission to ecclesiastical theology. Augustine established the dogma of “Original Sin” which distorted human nature in the Western imagination, making the non-Christian person devoid of this “divine image,” and even considered the human will completely helpless and bound by destructive lusts. Then came the era of religious reform with historical figures such as Martin Luther and John Calvin to consolidate this pessimistic view with greater intensity and firmer decisiveness. Al-Faruqi believes that Luther and Calvin strictly emphasized what they called the “Total Depravity” of human nature. Man, in the eyes of these reformers, became totally incapable of doing good by himself, his will lost all ethical or spiritual capacity, and he became a mere passive entity, or a “mass of clay” waiting for the overwhelming “divine grace” that chooses whom it wills and condemns whom it wills without an ethical criterion that the human mind can perceive. This systematic stripping of man’s humanity and his active ethical will is seen by al-Faruqi as a complete destruction of the essence of the free ethical message called for by Jesus, peace be upon him. Even in the corridors of contemporary theology, the researcher believes that giant thinkers such as Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich could not escape the grip of this dark pessimistic legacy. Barth, for example, denies humanity to anyone outside the orthodox Christian faith and considers that the only real human being is “Christ” and everything else is mere nothingness unless linked to him through faith. Tillich makes mere “existence” itself an “alienation” and an inevitable fall, in a sharp philosophical contradiction that escapes from rationality to the realms of mythology and existential pessimism that judges the essence of creation.

From the womb of this deep analysis, al-Faruqi carves a decisive and innovative term in his analysis: “Peccatism.” By this, he means that firm and fundamental Christianist belief that sin is an inevitable and universal phenomenon, and that it is inextricably rooted in the nature of every human being since birth. The book clearly indicates that Christian theology is not satisfied with the intuitive empirical statement that some people sin—for this is something no two people disagree on—but insists that all of humanity groans under the weight of an original sin and a necessary corruption that disables any possibility of self-goodness. The striking paradox revealed by al-Faruqi’s pen is that this excessive focus on the power and inevitability of evil is not just a fleeting pessimistic view, but is a necessary and vital pillar for the entire Christian theological structure; for without this “absolute and inevitable sin,” the concept of “divine redemptive salvation” loses its historical and ontological justification. In other words, Christian theology has historically needed to magnify and eternalize sin in order to create the urgent and absolute need for God’s direct intervention represented in the incarnation of Christ and his crucifixion to redeem this helpless and distorted humanity. This confusing position, as the researcher sees it, reminds us in an unmistakable way of Manichaean or Zoroastrian dualism, which makes evil a universal power equal to, and even necessary for, the existence of divine good and for justifying its actions.

This precise dissection brings us to the doctrine that is considered the other face of Peccatism, namely “Saviourism.” Al-Faruqi acknowledges that all religions seek to save man from a bad reality to a higher reality, but Christianity is unique and distinguished in that it is the “religion of salvation” par excellence, as it makes redemptive salvation the essence of the whole religion and its final goal. The writer here conducts a brilliant philosophical and historical comparison with Islam; Islam sees in divine revelation a salvation from polytheism and ignorance, but this salvation is merely a “starting point” (point zero) toward a long and continuous ethical mandate required by the “Sharia” and the cultivation of the earth with good deeds. The Muslim, then, lives his ethical being as a continuous “activist,” building his salvation through his diligent daily effort according to the divine will. In contrast, Christian “Saviourism” assumes that salvation is an “accomplished” external divine act that was completed once and for all on the cross. The Christian believer in this theological concept lives in a state of “self-satisfaction” or complacency; the major ethical task has been accomplished on his behalf, and he only has to believe, confess, and credit this redemptive act. Al-Faruqi sees with painful critical transparency that this conception paralyzes the true ethical agency of man, as it transforms redemption from a motive for action (as if Christ were a teacher or a high ethical role model that motivates giving) into a judicial or metaphysical arrangement that cancels individual responsibility. This complacency planted by “Saviourism” may provide, intentionally or unintentionally, the theological justification for the most heinous worldly practices, as long as “salvation” is guaranteed in advance by faith divorced from the viceregency action. The writer never denies the great educational value of the life and sacrifice of Jesus, peace be upon him, if viewed as an “ethical influence” that extends from the sublime role model to the followers to motivate them to repent and deep self-change (as called for by some liberal theologians in the modern era). But the fundamental problem lies in the traditional salvific theology that makes redemption a legally “paid price,” which cancels the urgent need for pure self-ethical effort, transforming ethics in its entirety into mere secondary “ethics of gratitude” that do not rise to the level of the serious divine mandate that man must carry as a vicegerent on earth.

After al-Faruqi deconstructed the structure of “Peccatism” and “Saviourism” in the individual conscience, he moves with his analytical scalpel toward the “Church” as an institutional and ontological entity, in what he calls “Ecclesialism.” Al-Faruqi believes that Christian theology, through its historical development, was not satisfied with making salvation an external divine act, but linked this salvation with an inseparable bond to belonging to the ecclesiastical institution. The Church here is not just an association of believers or a spiritual club, but is, in the traditional “Christianist” perspective, the “Mystical Body of Christ” and the only and necessary vessel for distributing divine “Grace.” The author sees this institutional shift as another step in weakening the “ethical agency” of the individual; for if salvation inevitably passes through the sacraments and rituals of the Church, then the ethical criterion shifts from pure “good deeds” toward “institutional obedience.” Al-Faruqi analyzes how this ecclesiastical centrality created a sharp duality in Western history between what is “sacred” (spiritual/ecclesiastical) and what is “secular” (temporal/secular). This duality, which the original message of Jesus did not know in its primordial simplicity, is what later paved the way for violent clashes between religion and the state, and between faith and science in the European experience.

In chapters that are both enjoyable and arduous, al-Faruqi reviews the dilemma of social ethics in Christianity. He starts from the tension existing between the “Ethics of the Mount” (absolute love, turning the other cheek, renouncing possessions) and the requirements of living in a complex human society that needs law, the judiciary, and military force to maintain order. The researcher believes that Christian theology, due to its nature that focuses on the “interior” and the “hereafter,” faced a historical difficulty in formulating a “Sharia” or an integrated social law that guides the affairs of the world. This legislative vacuum, as al-Faruqi analyzes, led to divergent theological solutions: either escaping from the world toward monasticism (ethical resignation from society) or accepting “dual loyalty” (render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s). The author stands for a long time at the views of the contemporary theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, who considered that “love” is an ethical ideal impossible to achieve in large social structures (such as states or classes), which forces the Christian to accept “relative justice” based on the balance of power instead of absolute ethics. Here, al-Faruqi’s rigorous criticism emerges: a religion that fails to provide an effective “guiding principle” for society and settles for internal idealism necessarily leaves the field open for materialist tendencies, extreme nationalism, and pure secularism to fill the vacuum and rule public life. This “social disability” of traditional salvific theology is what ultimately led to the disintegration of the ethical authority of religion in the modern West.

Al-Faruqi does not stop at the boundaries of the past, but extends his gaze to the present to analyze how these theological concepts leaked (even after the “death of God” in Western thought) into modern secular philosophies. Al-Faruqi believes that “Western Huma